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AN ABSTRACT OF '!'HE 'mESIS OF Wayne Alan Schroeder for the degree 
of 'Master of Arts in Political Science, presented Hovanber 221 1976 
TITIE: THEORETICAL DIFFERENCm IN KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER'S 
MODELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SlSTEM 
La.dis K. D. Kristof, Chairman 
~ 
Charles R. White 
This thesis is a study of national security decision making 
in the Ford Ad.ministration. The subject for study is the Kissinger-
Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will 
attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of 
national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the 
nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear
age and the means by which to preserve detente. 
An examination of the substantive policy differences will be 
preceded by an examination of the conceptual disagreements between 
.. 
the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of 
international politics. studies on decision making in 1ntemationa1 
politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception 
of the role that the United States should have in the international 
system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the 
preservation of peace. 
A:f't:.er having defined the theoretical differences between 
Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues :in international politics, an 
analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two 
Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's 
conception of the internati anal system. Policy differences between the 
two will be shown to have evo1ved out of disagreements over policy 
goals, and not policy implementation. 
Air:f' study of individual decision ma.king in defense and foreign 
affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of 
issues. Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy 
goals when new leadership emerges w.i. th which they are uncanfortable. 
It will be shown, through an ana.l:ysis of the foreign reaction to the 
Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that .foreign nations expressed 
concern for the outcome o.f this policy split. In particular, it will 
be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union. 
In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national 
security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach 
a canpromise on issues of policy because of fwxiamental. differences 
between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition 
of the national security in the nucl.ear age and the negotiating strategy 
that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations. These 
differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that 
each Secretary had on the nature of the international system. The study 
of their indi ndual perceptions will help to give one an understanding 
~ to ..tty the policy disagreements ma.de compromise impossible. 
THEORETICAL mFPERENCF.s IN KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER1S 
JlCDEIB OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEV 
BY 
Wayne Al.an Schroeder 
A thesis submitted in partial ful.fillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
IN 
Political Science 
Portland state University 
1976 
TO THE OFTICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH: 
The menbers of the Committee approve the thesis of 
Wayne Alan Schroeder, presented November 22, 1976. 
- - . -
APPROVED: 
---------------~ - . : "'{ te Studies and Research 
TABIE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
LIST OF TABIES • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • iv 
PART ONE - OKrGINS OF THE KISSINGER-SCHIESINGER CONTROVERSY 
CHAPl'Ell 
I 
n 
III 
AN ANALYSIS OF . INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DECISION 
. MAKING THEORIES FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS • • • • 
KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: 
RATIONAL AND NON--RATIONAL MODELS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
KISSINGER AND SClllESI NGER: 
DETENI'E AND THE SOVIET SYSTEM • • • • • • • • • • 
PART TWO - POLICIES AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCES 
IV KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGERt 
1 
6 
. 19 
POLITICAL MULTIPOL't.RITY ! STRATEGIC BIPOLARITY • • .35 
V KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: 
ISRAEL AND THE OCTOB~ WAR OF 197.3 • • • • • • • • 46 
VI KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: 
SALT 1 DETENTE AlID NEGOTIATING STRATEGY • • • • • • 60 
VIl ICTSSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: 
THE DIA REPORT AND 'lHE DEFENSE BUDGET 
•••••• 76 
VIII ICTSSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: 
FOREIGN AlID AMERICAN REACTION • • • • • • • • • • 89 
IX KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: 
CONCWSIONS AlID COl.amNTS • • • • • • • • • • • • • 102 
I 
• • • • • • • • • • 
108 BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
TAB IE 
I 
II 
LIST OF TABLES 
Defense Expenditures - Fiscal Year 1973 ••••• • 
YiJ.itary Manpowers ••• • •• • • • • • • • •• • • 
PAGE 
22 
23 
PART ONE 
ORIGINS OF THE KISSINGER-SCHLESIIDER CONTROVERSY 
KISSINGER 
v 
SCHLESINGER 
Chapter I 
AN ANALYSIS OF INDffiDUAL AND GROUP DECISION MA.KING THEORIES 
The policy confrontation that emerged in the Ford Administration 
between Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Secretary of Defense 
James R. Schlesinger is the focus of this thesis. If an accurate 
account of the reasons for the policy split is to be presented, the 
study of the theories of foreign and defense policy decision making 
will lllldoubtedl.Jr help in the developnent of a coherent description of 
the theoretica1 differences between the two men on the nature of the 
international system and the means by which policy decision makers 
should define policy goals. 
The nature of foreign policy decision making is such that the 
policy maker must continually strive for internal consistency and 
cohesiveness. According to Karl Deutsch, policy is ~~ 
"••••an explicit set of preferences and plans drawn .up to 
make the outcomes of series of future decisions more 
nearly predictable and cansistent".l 
Policy must have a consistency that will not hinder the ability of 
the foreign policy bureaucracy to make the policy effective. 
The political nature of foreign and defense policy decision 
malting is the most important part of the policy making process. 
Individuals with differing values, policy convictions and ccnceptions 
of reality converge upon Washington to make the process inherently 
a poll tical one. Canbined 1'i th the fact that each indi vi.dual is most 
probably a specialist in a particular field and represents a Department 
1) Kar1 Deutsch, '!he Analysis of International Relations, 
(Prentice RaJJ.: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968) P• 77 
with interests o:f'ten at odds with another Department, the process of 
decision making becomes one of resolving differing points of view and 
putting thEm into the proper persepctive. 2 This was certainly the 
case with Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Schlesinger. 
The subordination of secondary sets of policy objectives to 
primary policy objectives is often the cause of internal can.ru.ct. 
Internal. conflict must. be lessened through an attempt to reach an 
accomodation an -primary policy objectives through a process of 
11consensus building". 3 Consensus building demands compromise. 
If such compromise is not reached, the vezy structure of the decision
making system is threatened. A refusal to compromise can set off 
internal divisions that event~y must be resolved. 
The inability to reconcile competing interests most probably 
means that differences were so great that the procesS" of consensus 
building was made impossible. In the case of Secretary of State 
Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger the import.ance 
of such factors as conceptions of the nature of the interna.tiona1 1 
system, the problem of apply.i.ng power at the right instance and in the 
correct amount and the very developnent of a national. security 
strategy in an age of detente can clarify why comprcmise and consensus 
building was impossible. 
An individual's belief system is important in the process of 
2) Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense 
and Foreign Affairs, (Harper and Row: New York, 1971) P• 15 
3) ibid., P• 117 
2 
developing a conception of the international system. Ole Holsti's 
study of the belief 87Btem or John Foster Dulles concluded from a 
content a.naJJr:sis of Dulles• public statements that Dulles had a rigid 
perception of Sov.tet Communism.4 He labeled this percept.ion or 
Dulles as "'t.he inherent; bad faith of the Communist model•·. Dulles 1 
point of v.tew ma.de any attempt at easing tensions between the u.s. 
and the Sov.tet Union quite unlikely. 
The perception of the individual. decision maker is one t.bat 
permeates much of the literature by political scientists in the study 
of defense and foreign policy decision making. The actors in the 
decision making process often define the situation in entirely 
different terminology.' This is often due to the fact that the 
psychology of the decision maker is influenced by his educationa1 
and professional backgrollllde This can inevitably lead to different 
appraisals of 'What policy goals should be. 
Policy goals are canpli cated by the fact that many inputs 
confuse a decision maker's perception of what actually is at issue.6 
A study of the background and writings or Kissinger and Schlesinger 
on such topics as pOW"er, anns control and the need to maintain a 
military balance will be helpful in giving us an appreciation of the 
4) Ole Holst.i, "The Belief System and National Images", 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, (1962) PP• 244-252 
3 
5) Richard Snyder, H. w. Bruck and Burton Spain, "'!be Decision 
Vaking Approach to the Study of International Politics", 
International Politics and Foreign Policy, James Rosenau (ed.): 
(The Free Presss New York, 1969) P• 202 
6) Robert; H. Jervis, ''Hypothesis on Misperception", ibid., 
PP• 246-250 
4 
different perceptions of the two Secretaries on matters of national 
secu.ri.ty policy. 
Decision making by individuals in internaticnal politics can be 
studied also from another perspective that can help us to prove that 
the policy differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger were motivated 
by two entirely different modes of thinking. Sidney Verba' s study of 
the developnent of rational and non-rational approaches to the study of 
decision making is very helpful in this regard. Verba develops a 
rational model that stresses the decision maker• s cognizance of his 
policy goals and his desire to pursue policies that accanplish that 
purpose. Power is assumed to be limited by poll ti cal factors. The 
non-rational model emphasizes such non-logical forces as fear and 
the personality of the decision maker. The non-rational model is 
less idealistic. Non-logical forces of which the decision maker is 
unaware help to influence his reaction to events. The decision maker's 
,. 
emotional involvement with the issue at hand, according to Verba, can 
increase ~the effect of ncn-logical and predispositional influences11 J 
The rational and non-rational approaches to the models of the 
international system will be applied to this study of the decision 
making and policy differences of Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger. 
A canparison of the two styles will shovr that deep theoretical differ-
ences were evident and that these help to explain the substantive policy 
differences between them. 
7) Sidney Verba, 11Assmnptions of Rationality and Non-Ra.ti~nality 
in Models of the International System", ibid., P. 221 
After having reviewed the individual belief' systms and 
perceptions or Kissinger and Schlesinger, the study of the substantive 
policy differences between them will beccne much easier to understand, 
and the reasons .for the need by President Ford to reso1 ve these 
differences will be apparent even to the harshest critics or the two 
Secretaries. 
Chapter II 
KISSINGER AND SCHLFSINGER: @TIONAL AND NON-RATIONAL MODEIS 
OF THE INI'ERNATIONAL SYS'l'Ell 
This chapter will explore the uses of rational and non-rational 
models in explaining the theoretical differences between Kissinger and 
Schlesinger. In doing so it will show that their models of decision 
making originate from entirely different premises. 
The non-rational model cf' the international system fits the 
decision making model of Secretary Schlesinger. It assumes that the 
decision maker has little control over certain · aspects of the system. 
<:ne good example for Secretary Schlesinger would be his approach to 
anns control decision making. Country A cannot cooipel Country B 
to liml t the size of its strategic forces, but it can deter the other 
side .1"r001 initiating an attaok through the use of a balance of terror 
strategy that makes the probability of attack less likely. 
Fonner Secretary Schlesinger's model places faith in "deterrence•. 
-----Deterrence denotes an ability to prevent an adversary from the use of 
force through an equivalent or superior force. Comparability of force 
structures is inevitable under the deterrence approach. Schlesinger 
states that, 
"••• our defense capabilities and plarming should be ma.de in 
the light of the capabilities of our opponents ••• our planning 
objectives should be such that no opponent has a unilateral 
advantage over usn.l 
1) "Fiscal Year 1976 and J~-September Transition Period Authori-
zation for Military Procurement, Research ard Developnent and 
Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel strengths", 
Hearings Before the Ca:mnittee on Armed Services of the United 
States S~ate, February 5, 1915, 94th Congress, First Session, 
(U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, D.c., 1975) P• 14 
7 
Sch1esinger maintains that defense planning involves admitting 
that decision making must o.t"t;en be made :Ill terms or what we must do 7 
to deter a nation fnl!l acting in an aggressive manner, rather than 
what we must do to persuade them to fo11ow a course that is rationall.y ,,,. 
. . --- - --
beneficia1 to them. Because of his non-rational approach to decision 
making, Schlesinger tends to build dichotomies about the intem{ltional 
s;rstem that serve to reinforce his faith in deterrence, as when he states 
that, 
"•••we must recognize that we are dea.l.:ing in a world that is 
militarily dominated by two states, ours and the Soviet Unionn.2 
The military bipolarity of the United States and the Soviet Union 
luads Schlesinger to the conclusion that the _ United States must retain 
a &t.eadfa:stness in our comnitments aroo.nd the world and be the major 
c01mterba1ance to the Soviet UnionJ Detente is ma.de possible through 
the maintenance of a strong military capability.h 
The concentration on Soviet and .American strategic capabilities 
gives Schlesinger a conception of the international system in llhich 
the military-strategic balance dominates the political multipola.rity 
2) "Fiscal year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, 
Research and Developnent and Active Duty, Selected Reserve 
and Civilian Personnel Strengths~, Hearings Before the Camnittee 
on Armed Services of the United States Senate, February 5, 1914, 
93rCi Congrese, second Session (u.s. Government Printing Offices 
Washington_, D. c. , 1975) p. 7 
.,\ 7:• -.. .... -:-.',·~ ; ".·\;i~::~;. ~ .. :·.: ·.'···~ .• --: .  :::: , .~ : ·~ . : ~ :: ., · ...• :; 
3} FY 1976 Defense Hearings, op. cit., P• 8 
4) "The Nani.nation of James R. Schl.esinger to be Secretary or 
. De.f"ense" 1 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services 0£ 
the United States Senate, JUDe _18, 1913, 93ra Congress, First 
session, (U.S. Government; Printing Office: Washington, D.c., 
1973) P• 43 -
of the systan. Power is st.ill the dominant factor in the maintenance 
ot international political stability according t.o the Sch1esinger 
model. The strategic bipolarity of the system t.hat Schlesinger 
describes makes it inescapable that the United States is the "l.eader 
of' t.he f'ree world" and must counter Soviet mili.tar;y presence wherever 
it presents a tbreat.5 
aoa:u, of attaining detente through mutually beneficial inter-
actions are subordinated to the strategic balance. The military-
strategic balance outweighs such factors as economic interdependence, 
) 
internal domestic stru.ctures and the influence of public opinion on 
8 
the nature of a nation's national security policy. The justi:f'ieation }
for large military expenditures and increases in technological capacity
are generated frcm Schlesinger's -comparative approach to the strategic-
military balance. 
Because of the inequality of pmrer that exists in the international 
system, Sch1esinger sees the spread of nuclear weapons as undesirable 
because it wou1d upset the stability of the strategies of the supel'-
pcnrers.6 Because of the dangers of proliferation, nuclear weapons 
should be distributed unequally so as to discourage the chances for 
catastrophe.7 This forces Schlesinger into the position of defending 
the improvements in the strategic capability of the United States, since 
he objects to a Soviet d<llli.nance of the system. This rein.forces his 
5) FI 1976 Defense Hearings, op.cit., P• 29 
6) James R. Schlesinger, nNuclear Spread: The Setting of the 
Problem"·• Selected Papers on National Security: The RAND 
Paper Series II 5284, September l974, P• l3 
7) ibid., P• 14 
bipolar conception of the nature e:f the international s;ystem. 
Sclllesinger•s adherence to the non-rational approach to 
decision making is evident in his ana.l.y-sis of the arms control 
policies of nations. It is based on the conviction that the monop]3 
.-. 
of nuclear weapons of the superpowers is a st.abilizing influence and 
serves as a deterrent to the spread of nuclear weapans.8 Schl.esinger•s 
belief that the rationalist approach to anns control is l.i.111ited is 
evident in his eTcllua.tion that 
•· •• • • the use of rational models presupposing quick perception, 
development and absorption of new technologies and a high degree 
of interaction based on astute JD()ves and countermoves leads to 
a. misunderstanding of the arms control problem•·.~ 
9 
Beca.11Se perceptions are limited and lmmrledge so often inccmplete, 
Schlesinger denies that .rationality and flexibility are inherent in 
the devel.opnent of ams control policy. Political. decisions are 
"beyond the reproach• of the rational model because political decision 
making often neglects the technical aspects of the situation and makes 
a decision in terms of llbat is politically expedient.10 Moreover, 
policy makers tend to smother differences of opinion.11 The time 
element makes it d1fficu1t and sometimes impossible for national 
security decision makers to study problems in detail, and ort.en forces 
8) James R. Schlesinger, "Arms Interaction and Arms Control", 
Se1ected PtSers on the Nationa.1 Securit~r The RAND Paper 
Series # r4, September 1974, PP• 31-3 
9) ibid., P• 24 
10) James R. Schlesinger, •en Relating Non-Technica1 Elements 
to Systems Studies", Selected Papers on the National. Security: 
The RAND Paper Series # 5284, September 1974, P• 76 
11) ibid. I P• 84 
10 
~-
them to rel,y on past experiences and the advice of their subordinates.12 
Rational decision making is impeded because of the limitations or human 
reason and lmowledge. 
Schlesinger argued in favor of the use of s;rstems analysis in order 
to enable the decision maker to consider the long range consequences of 
potential. decisions, and thereby l1mi t the subjective preferences of the 
decision maker.13 Politics- has to be kept to a minimum if' a decision is 
to be effective. 
. Such a philosophy' tends to make Schlesinger appear to be emcerned 
with the perceptions that the other side, .in most eases the Soviet Union, 
has or American power rather than the utility of American power itself.14 
The bipolarity of the international systan, the need for the decision 
maker to limit his subjective preferences and the necessity of counter-
balancing the Soviet Union places the United States in the position of 
having to respond to each Soviet increase in strategic and military 
strength with-a coITesponding u. s. increase. 
Schlesinger•s perception of the Soviet-American strategic balance 
and his mncem w.tth the perception of nationa1 power illustrate~ that 
' 
non-rational factors daninate the Schlesinger model of the international. 
system. The strategic bipola.ri ty of the system dominates the poll tica1 
multipolarity of the system and makes the relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union one that will determine the stability of the 
12) ibid., P• 67 · 
l3) James R. Schlesinger, •'nte Uses and Abases of Analysis", 
reprinted in the Sch1esinger ncmd.nation bearings, op. cit., P• 7 
14) Peter J. Ognibene, •Hard Choices in the Defense Bwiget", 
Canmonwea1• June 6, 1975, P• l.69 
11 
entire international political system. 
Secretary of State Henr.r A. Kissinger's model or" the international. 
__ J·lL 
system differs qw.ns sharply .fran that of Dr. Sch1esinger. It is 
rational, emphasizes the importance of politics. and can be described 
as one that· embraces "Realpolitika. 
Kissinger's most important contribution to the study of inter-
national politics is his descriptian of arevolut.icmarT' and a1egitimatett 
political l!lystems. These two concepts, combined with Kissinger's 
emphasis on negotiation and diplomacy, the role of the gifted individual 
leader in Kissinger•s ·writings and his belier that power has a new 
definition in the nuclear age confinns the rational models for 
Dr. Kissinger. Kissinger concerns himself with the role that domestic 
structures and the bureaucracy have in the ma.king of foreign policy 
decisions and concludes that they often impede the developnent of a 
truly creative foreign policy. 
/ 
The concept of revolutionary and legitimate international systens7 
is important in llllderstanding the Kissinger model because it serves 
to detemine the nature of relations between states.15 Revolutionary 
systems, says Kissinger, are systems in llbich one or more nations 
re:!'use to accept the system itself, and desire to replace it with a 
new international system that corresponds to its own values. Legitimate 
systems are ones in which each system member is satisfied with the 
system, favors a retention of the status quo 1 and works within the 
systen to accampli sh change. This is import.ant because Kissinger 
lS) H8nr,. A. Kissinger, Nuclear W91ons and Foreign Policz, 
(Harpe·r aid Bros. 1 New York, l9 7) P• 317 
12' 
believes that the Soviet Union and Canmunist China hB.ve increasingly' 
shown tbenselves to be _interested in w0rld.ng within a legitimate inter- . 
national framework and do not desire a re"fision of the status quo. 
Since the object of any international system is to preserve the 
peace, peace can only ·occur in a system where there is an acceptance 
of the legitimacy of the system. states that feel threatened will 
attampt to gain 11abs~lute superiority" by tring to overthrow the stat118 
quo.16 Because the tendency for revolutionary powers to seek absolute 
security is destructive, a legitimizing principle is needed on which all / 
nations of the systan can agree. The legitimizing principle is peace.17 
Peace is arrived at through the use of international agreements and 
negotiations that adjust dif.f'erences through minimization of crises.18 
In this way the legitimacy of_ the international system is strengthened. 
Diplanacy can be used by men to gain constructive changes that will help 
preserve the peace. Of great importance in this process is the estab-
lishment of confidence and credibility by both sides.19 Kissinger believes 
that peace serves as the legitimizing principle by which revolutionary 
powers can come to accept the international system. Once the legitimacy 
of the systan bas been established, it can be perpetuated through the 
use of diplcxnacy by statesmen who understand how the systm operates.20 
16) Stephen R. Graubard, Kissin~ert Portrait of a Mind, 
w. w. Norton &. Co.i Ne'fi Yor , 1973) P• 17 
17) ibid. 1 P• 276 
16) Amos Perlmutter, "Crisis Managements Kissinger's Middle Ea.st 
Negotiations, October 1973-June 1974•, International Studies 
Quarterly, September 1975, P• 346 
19) ibid., P• 331 
20) Thanas J. Noer, "Kissinger's Fhilosophy of History", 
Vodern Age, Spring 1975~ P• 182 
13 
To Kissinger, the clash of competing interests is the cause of 
confilct. 21 For connicts to cease, interests must be made as uniform 
as possible. The most opportune time for the integration of interests 
is when a stalemate has been reached · and neither side can emerge w.i th a 
distinct ad~tage over the other. 22 When such a stalemate has been 
reached, it is necessary for statesmen to bui1d coalitions and seek 
partnerships so that new goals for the system can be made. 23 Kissinger 
is cognizant or his policy goals and tries to pursue policies that will 
change the goal structure if there is a clash of interests. This is the 
so-called "mean-ends" approach for the rational model.. 
Kissinger's rational model or the international system is further 
exemplified by his concept of the individual leader. 'lhe political 
leader can take actions that will help to form a "structural rearrange-
ment" or the international system. 24 The true test or diplomacy is 
whether it adds to the stability of the system. Kissinger's preoccupation 
w:i. th individual leadership is . well worth noting. The element/' of choice 
is always present 1 and the foreign policy clloices that will be made 
depend on the political leadership of the nation. 25 . This reinforces his 
belie! in the rational model for decision making in :the intemationaJ. 
21) ibid., P• 186 
22) John D. Mcntgomer;r, "The Education of Henry Kissinger", 
Journal or International Affairs, Spring 1975, P• 61 
23) ibid., P• 53 
24) The N81r York Times, October 13, 1974, P• 34 
25) Graubard, op.cit.~ P• 317 
system. The best example of .Kissinger's faith in individual leadership 
is bis stud;r of the peace established at the Congress of Vienna by 
Metternich and Castlereagh. The personalization of diplomaey is the 
end resu1t er Kissinger's concept of indiT.ldual leadership. 
The need for personalization is a ~spaose to the need for 
rational. procedures through 'Which crises can be managed. Nations can 
escape the f'ate of war and tragedy if they entrust their foreign and 
security policies to gif"t;ed individuals who can exercise the tt.se of 
power, wisely. Kissinger's ell tist approach was very evident in his 
tenure as NSC adT.lsor to President Nixan. Nixan and !issinger both 
believed that by centralizing.decision making in the NSC on foreign 
policy matters, they could prevent the state Department from impeding 
the developnent of the Administration's foreign policy.26 
' Personalistie approaches to foreign policy decision making were 
favored by Kissinger because be believed that bureaucracies tend to be 
mcreative.27 Bureaucracies are the -greatest hindrance to individaal 
leadership and creative action because 
"••• the bureaucracy absorbs the energies or top executives 
in reconciling what is expected with what happens; the 
analysis of where one is overwhelms the consideration of 
where one s~ould be going... Decision naking can grow so 
canplex that the process of producing a concensus may 
overshadow the purpose of the effort•.28 
26) Wilfred· L. Kohl, 11'l'he Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System 
and u. S.-European Relationsz Patterns of Policy Making"• 
World Poli tics, October 1975, P• 7 
27) Graubard, op.cit., P• h9 
28) Henry A. Kissinger, "Danestic Structures and Foreign Policy", 
Daedalus, Spring 1966, p. 509 
l.5 
While Secretary Schlesinger saw power as san.ething that serves to 
deter actors_ in the_international. system from aggression, Henry Kissinger 
bas come to believe that power has becane U8eless in the nuclear age. The 
overwhelming monopol7 of power possessed b7 the United states and the 
Soviet Union often limits the ability of the superpowers· to respond to 
crises because of the fear that the other side might intervene. 29 Power 
is neutral, and the real paKer lies- with the men who control the instru-
ments of destruction.JO The possession of nuclear weapons b7 the Soviet 
Union is not as important to the security of the United States as the 
canposition of the Soviet Leadership and their responsiveness to our mm 
initiatives for the negotiation of differences. This· is an example or how 
the rational approach-to decision making can be -extended-to Dr. Kissinger. 
Kissinger sees the internatio~l system as one in l'lhich a strategic 
bipolarity and a political multipol.arity eoexist.31 He differs .fran 
Schlesinger in that he believes that with the advent of nuclear weapons, 
the utility of our strategic and military arsenals is diminished. He 
states that 
•. • • The most striking feature of the contemporary system... is the 
radica1 transformation in -the nature of power. Throughout histor,y 
power is more complex. Mill tary pmrer does not equal political 
ini'luence ••• With the overwhelming arsenals of the nuclear age, 
however, the pursuit ~~ marginal advantage is both pointless and 
potentiall7 sucidal". 
29) Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (McGraw Hill 
& Co.t N8'J York, 196$) P• 18 
30) Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown & 
Co.t Boston, 1974, P• 47 
31) Henr.r A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policz, ( w. w. Norton 
& Co.: New York, 1974) P• 56 
32) Henry A. Kissinger, "Making Foreign PolicT', Center Magazine, 
Januaey 1974, P• 38 
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Kissinger's definition .of power and llbat it constitutes is much 
broader than that of :or; Schlesinger. Kissinger believes that non-
strategic factors must be included in the dete:rmination of national 
security requirements. This definition of national security and power 
makes Kissinger quite skeptical. al:~cmt attempts by the superpowers to gain 
a technological. advantage over the other.33 !:mprovements in the deve1op-
ment or a national security strategy are oi'ten forfeited because of the 
overwhelming desire to build new technologies. Consequent'.cy' the creation 
of defense strategies against wars of liberation• limited warfare, subver-
sion end eeon<mic weakness are subordinated to improVBnents in nuclear 
capabilities • .34 The maximum developnent of pmrer in the nuclear age 
must· be a great cc:mcent for national security decision makers because• ••• 
with modern technology such a course must ~e the will".35 ' 
strategic doctrine transcends the maximum developnent of power 
according to Kissinger. This cmtrasts sharp1y 'With Secretary Sch1esinger•s 
faith' in deterrence and his comparative approach to determining nationa1 
security needs. Kissinger's disbelief in the adequacy of nuclear detel"-o 
rence to meet national security needs is based on his assumption that the 
utility of nuclear weapons as an instrument of warfare is v:l.rlually zero. 
Strategic doctrine should be flexible enough so that a pattern of response 
to the non-nuclear challenges can be made. 36 
3.3) Kissinger, Nuc1ear Weapons and Foreign Policy• op.cit •• P• 16 
34) ibid., P• )1 
35) ibid., P• 18 
.36) ibid. , P• 18 
Kissinger believes that securit.y and peace are interconnected, 
and that the intemational SY"Btm should be l.ess geared to crisis arid 
more geared to cooperation.37 Attempts t.o gain strategic advantage 
over the Soviet Union can only 21erve to jeopardize the stability of 
the newlJ" created legitimate illternationa.1 system. For peace to becane 
a reality both sides most benefit fran the si tua.tion.38 This inTol ves, 
of necessity, a change in the goal. structure. The political ramifica.-
tions of introducing conceptions of national security that are based on 
military and strategic !actors alone can forestall the acceptance of the 
international. system by national leaders with prev:iouslJf' revolntionary 
inclinations. 
Henr;r Kissinger's model of the international. system is clearly one 
- . 
that is rational. Kissinger's developnent of legitimate and revolution-
ary systems, his belief that povrer is limited. in the nuclear age and his 
faith in the ability of' men to take actions that can enhance the stability 
of the intematimal systen are evidences of this. To Kissinger, a 
definition of' the national security must be broad enough so that it. does 
not view the . strategic-military balance as the most impor&ant determi-
ant of' policy. Ot.herwise the pursuit of technological advantages will 
be the end result, and the possibility that the legitimacy of the system 
will be questioned could _ ruin the chances for peace in the future. 
37) "NClliination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State", 
Hearings Before the Conmittee on Foreign Relations of the 
Uiiited States Senate, 93r:d Congress, First Session, par£ Che, (u.s. GOvernment Printing Office: Washington, n.c., 1973) p. 100 
38) 0 Detente 1974 n ~ Hearings Before the Camni ttee on Foreign 
Relations of the bnited States senate, 93r:d Congress, Second 
Session, September 19, 1974 (U.S. GOvemmmt Printing Office: 
Washington, D.C., 1974) P• 238 
/ 
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Dr. Scb1eslliger•s model o! the international system differs .:f'rom 
that of Dr. Kissinger in that Schlesinger sees non-rational, t.echniCal 
and apolit.ica.1 elements as important in the developnent or a nation's 
foreign and defense policies. Schlesinger's concem with the strategic 
balance dominates his thinking. Strategic bipolarity has been the 
principal reason .for the success that t.he international. system has had 
in preventing the outbreak of another world war. Strategic bipolarity 
must be viewed canparti veJ.i, and advances by the Soviet Union in strate-
gic capabilitiesmust be taken into consideration. The United states 
might have to respond to Soviet technological improvements, according 
to the Schlesinger model, with improvements in its own technology. 
Two di.ff er:ing models of the international system have been devel-
oped for both Kissinger and Schlesinger that depict a deep disagreement 
between the two Secretaries on the nature of the international. system, 
and such eoncepts as power, the national security, deterrence and peace. 
Kissinger•s ccncern 'With creating a legitimate framework in his writings 
causes him to question the traditional American approaches to deterrence 
and the national security that have accompanied American decision making 
since the end of the Second World War. Detente is seen by Kissinger as 
the outgrowth of the acceptance or the legitimacy of the international 
system by formerly revolutionary powers. Dr. Schlesinger sees detente 
made possible through a strong American mill tary and strategic capability. 
Two opposing philosophies such as these give indications that substantive 
policy differences between the two men on issues o.f u. s. nationa1 
security were more than likely as long as they remained in positions o.f 
responsibility in the Ford Administration. 
J 
Chapter III 
KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: DETENTE AND THE SOVIET SISTEK 
Detente with the Sovi.et Union was a major point or disagreement 
between Kissinger and Schlesinger, so therefore an analysis of their 
attitudes towards Soviet Comnnm:ism and the Soviet system would hel.p to 
give one an understanding of why they disagreed on detente. Individual 
decision makers must develop belie! systems and establish attitudes 
about the -world in which they live so that they can reduce the amounts 
of info:nnation they receive fl-an the bureaucracy about foreign and. 
defense affairs into a manageable form. Because of the need to do this, 
individual decision makers often reject information that does not fit 
into their image, or model or the international system.l The purpose or 
this chapter is to examine the belief systems of Kissinger and Schlesinger, 
trace its developnent and conclude as to whether or. not it could cause 
them to reject certain infonnation that would trbeaten their theoretical 
conception of the ·international system. 
· secretary Schlesinger's belief system was strongly related"to his 
educational and professional background. As an econanist, his analysis 
of the role of econanics in the international system and in the national 
../ 
decision making process is helpful in understanding his attitudes toward 
the Soviet system. 
Schlesinger's comparative approach to systems studies and econcmic 
analysis leads him to the conclusion that political forces dominate the 
1) Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations, 
(Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968) P• Sl 
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decision making precess for eeonanics in the. Soviet Union. In analyzing 
the Soviet econanic system, and its capabilities for supporting a militarT 
industrial cmp1ex, Schlesinger eonc1udes that the percentage of the 
Soviet econooiy is a1ready highly militarized. 2 This bas put a great 
strain on the Soviet economy 1 because of the increas:ing demands of the 
populace for consuner goods. 
Schlesinger's analysis of the Soviet economy conc1udes that Soviet 
military expansion has cane at the cost. of domestic econanic go~. The 
fact that the Soviets have achieved large rates of industrial. growth is 
not as important as the fact that the proportion of the Soviet econ<JDY' 
that is need for initial resource allocations is quite low. What. remains 
a.f't.er the initial resource allocations have been made ·cou1d be used for 
Soviet defense purposes.3 Bnt. the soviets do not develop econc:mdc policies 
on the same premises as Westeni ·nations, because political forces, not 
market forces, dominate the .economic decision making that must. accan.pany 
any determination of national security needs.4 
The political decision makers of the Soviet Union need not concem 
them.selves with the impact of an increase in the military sector of their 
econany because the econmy is controlled .from the top down. The laws 
2) James R. Schlesinger, The Political. Econrz of National 
Security, (Praeger: New York, 1960) P• 5 
3) James R. Schlesinger, "CD Relating Non-Technical. Elements 
to Systems .Studies", Selected Papers on National Securitz: 
'!'he RAND Paper Series fl 5284, September 1974, P• 89 
4) Sch1esinger, The Politica1 Econmy of Nationa1 Securitz1 
op.cit., P• lb9 
21 
or n.ppJ.7 and demand do not app]Jr t.o the Soviets, so the arguments of 
Western econami. sts that the Soviets .must eventually face the fact that 
the militarin.t.ion of _the econany is detrimental do not app:cy-._ 'lhe 
interna.1 weakness of the Savi.et system does not convince Schlesinger 
that the Soviets will forego furlher militarization. If' anything• 
Schlesinger is skeptical as to hmr an econany can devote su~ large 
shares of its Gross National Product to military purposes without its 
~ventua1 utilization. To be assured of S~et good intentions• 
Sch1~singer wou1d first ~ve to see a transforamtion in econanic 
decision making for national security purposes in the Soviet Union. 
He believes that the Soviet leadership does not need to conf'orm· ~ 
West.em standards o:t increasing its attention to the demands of' consnmers. 
Besides, totalitarian nations do not need to concern thanselves with the 
problem of' resistance to militarisaticm1 and have t _raditional.JJr had a 
larger military component in their economies than t~e democracies. 
: SchlesiDger•s fears were in part due to the fact that the United 
States has fal1en behind the Soviet Union in both defense expenditures 
and military manpower.S The following tables, taken f'rcm Schlesinger's 
annual Defense Report; for Fiscal Year 1976, show wbY he was concerned 
with these developnents. 
5) Fiscal Year 1976, .Annual Defense Report, Secretary of Defense 
James R; Schiesinger · ~ 
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4. S (millions) 
4.o 
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2.0 I 
64 65 66 67 68 69 10 71 72 73 74 75 
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Scbl.esinger•s tendency to use oonparative statistics in order to 
prove his point closely' resembles the model that was developed for b.ila 
that stressed the comparative approach to decision ll&ld.ng. Sch1esinger 
has reported that while the United States spends less than six percent 
of its Gross National Product on defense related activities, the Soviet 
Union spends f'i.f't.een .percent or its GNP on national. defense.6 In real. 
terms the Soviets are increasing their military expenditures at the rate 
of three percent per year, while the United States bas been shrinking 
its expenditures at approximately' the same rate.7 The American situation 
is .further complicated by the fact that over half' of our mill tary expend-
itures -go into paying personnel --eosts;-a-s was the- case i.n· Fiscal -Year - -
1975, when the defense budget totaled $ 92 billion and $ 50 billion went -
into milita.ey personnel caapensation.8 '.Ihe Soviets do not have the 
problan. of giving attractive .sal.aries in order to encourage enlistments, 
and can concentrate. on weapons research and developnent. 
Along w:1. th the changing mill tar,- bal.anoe; Schlesinger was skeptical 
or Soviet intentions for ideological reasons. In spite of detente, the 
6) James R. Sch1esinger, •:A Testing Time for America", 
Fortlllle, Febl"WU7 1976, P• 148 
7) ibid., P• l.49 
8) "Fl.seal Year 1975 Authorization for llilitary Procurement, 
Research and developnent and Active Duty, Selected l?eserve 
am Civilian Persmnel strengths", Hearin~ Before the 
Committee on Armed Services of the thiited~tes ·Senate 
February 5, 1975, 93i'd Congress, Second Session .(tJ.s. ~ern­
ment Prlliti.ng Office: Washington, D.c., 1975) P• 26o 
Soviets• ideologica1 stance and doctrine of -the inevitable down.fal.1 or 
capitalism bas not changed. In analyzing the nature or the Soviet threat 
before the Senate Armed Services Canmittee in 197$ Schlesinger said that 
11
•• • we can e:xpect frc:m MoscCJW a· pursuit and increase 
or the ideologiea1 struggle, and a belief on the pa.rt 
or Soviet leaders that detente has aITived because of 
a shift or historical forces in its .favor ••• •9 
Sch1esinger•s skepticism. about Sovi.et motivations for pursuing 
detente can be understood when his econani c and ideological criticism 
or the Soviet system are tkaen into account. These reservations• 
caabined with his emphasis on the strategic bipolarity of the intema-
tional system, make Scb1esinger belieTe that the role o.f the United 
states should be to colD'lter Soviet influence throughout the world. 
Schlesinger advocates a unifo:nnity in our defense commitments that does 
not accoun"t for di.f.ferences in the politics of a sub-system. Such 
mdformity leads to a scenario reminiscent or the u.s. involvement in 
Vietnam, as when he states that. 
"••• we have vital interests in Westem Ea.rope, the Jlidd1e 
F.a.st, the Persian Gul.f and Asia. Despite detente n need 
a greater degree ot,steadfastness in our commitments 
around the world". 
9) "Fiscal Year 1976 and July"-September Transition Period 
Authorization for llilitary Procurement, Research and 
Developnent. and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths", Hearllift Before the 
Camnittee cm Armed Serrlces or the Uni ea: states 
Senate, Febl"WU"T 5, 1975, 94th Congress, F:trSt Session, (U. s. Goverm.ent Printing 0.ffice: Washington• D. c., 
1975) P• 13 
10) FI 1976 Defense hearings, op.cit., P• 8 
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Schlesinger believes that this is necessary because of the !act 
that third parties are incapable of ccnpeting with the United States 
and the Soviet. Union in the military and strategic spheres.11 The 
resul.t is the necessity for the United st.ates to take upon itsel.t 
commitments !or which it might be unprepared or unrl.lling to undertake 
because of dmestic poll ti cal mi.sgi vings. 
Secretary- Sc.hl.esinger•s belief system can be said to have been 
gained .from his training as an econanist ard strategic analyst. As an 
economist concerned 1li th the process aC distributing goods and services 
to people, Schlesinger sees the Soviet system as one that centralized 
decision making on the hands of a political elite 'Who need not concern 
thEDSelves with the danestic danands and inputs of its populace. 'ftle 
.fact that the Soviet Union has increased military spending at the cost 
of danestic goals hardens his auspicton or the tn motivations of the 
Soviets. His analysis of the Soviet syBtem and its ideology makes him 
think in terms or comparisons and dichotanies. The Schlesinger belier 
systen, a1though smewhat modified, is an extension of the post World 
War II attitude of the American national security making policy elite. 
It accepts America•s role as the principal p01Jer in the world that will 
contest ~ rea1 or perceived. Soviet advance in the world. The contain-
11.ent doctrine is still found applicable in spite or detente. 
11) James R. Schlesinger• "The Strategic Consequences ot 
Nuclear Proliferation•1 Selected ~~ers on the National. 
Security: The RAND Pa.per Serles II 5 84, September 1974 P• ll · 
The Schlesinger belief system is rigid and infierible towards the 
Soviets because it insists that So'ri.et goaJ.s have not changed.. What has 
changed, according t.o Scb1esinger, is the means by which the Soviets 
pursue their goal.s. There "i.1S no consideration that the Soviets desire 
detente because of a need to establish what Kissinger would call a 
legitimate internationa1 system because Q:f a genuine desire for peace. 
Schlesinger could only be convinced of a genuine Soviet desire to persue 
detente if Soviet society itself undenrent an internal transformation 
that. made it. similar t.o the Westem democracies. 
As a political. scientist, Henry Kissinger reaches similar . 
conclusions-as ·-ta- the inefficiencies in the Soviet system, but he 
appr0aches the question o~ how this should -effect .Ame?-ica•s .policy 
towards the Soviets .fran an entirely different perspective from that 
of Dr. Schlesinger. Kissinger's concern is that the transformation 
of the :interna:tional. political systm does not necessitate an internal 
transfo:nnation of the SoViet system itself. Extern3.l conditions can 
facilitate cooperation in spite of the internal contradictions .of the 
So'ri.et and American systems. 
The ideology of' Cannmnism 'sbapes the sense of' reality. of sOviet 
leaders in the thinking of Kissinger.12 Practical eoncems . enter 
into any leader's actions, but Kissinger sees Communism as an ideology 
which. dictates the perception of reality or Soviet Cammmrl.st leaders. 
12) Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, (McGraw Hill 
Co.:, New York, 1965) P• 196 
His skeptia:tsm about the SoTiet C~st SY"Stem is evident when he 
states that 
..... in the Soviet conception man is the product of a 
social experience, a datum to be manipu1ated for his 
om good11.l3 
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The Soviet emphasis on the class struggle and their belief that 
a socialist triumph over capitalism is inevitable a.re convictions 
that are held by both Kissinger and Schlesinger. But Kissinger's 
belief system differs frm Schlesinger in that he regards the external 
inf'luences of the intenaational political. system as of greater mpol'-
tance to the pursuit _of'_detente by the Soviets than the fact that they 
think this is the resul.t of historical forces. Former]J revolutionar,y 
pa1rers have begun to accept the legitimacy of the international polit-
ical system, name:cy- the Soviet Union an:i Communist China.lh 
Kissillger's traditicnal view of .America's role in the world and 
his distrust o.f Commmism are -factors in bis adherence to Realpolitik.15 
A reallan and pragmatism are apparent in his belier system that cause 
him to prefer a reduction in .American commi. tments around the world.16 
13) Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policz, 
(Harper and Bros. t New York, 19$7) P• 328 
J.4) John D. Montgmery, "The Education of Henry Kissinger"• 
Journal of International Affairs, Spring 19751 P• Sl 
15) Laurence stern, •Two Henrys Descending", Foreign Policy, 
Spring l97S, P• 176 
16) J. L. s·. Girling, "·Kissingerismi The Enduring Problems", 
International Affairs, ~ 1975, P• .328 
The policies of the thited States and other countries must content to 
a rapi~ changing politieaJ. scene. The rapidity of change makes the 
need for systm stability al.1 the more important. 
At one time 'Kissinger believed that. the Soviet Union's main goal. 
was to prevent st.ability.17 The SoTiets w.:mid ue a treaty for their 
own purposes 1 w.l thout regard for the mora1 or legal importance of the 
treaty.18 This is very important when one considers the Kissinger 
negotiating st~tegy and the oirticisms that Secretar;y Schlesinger 
made or Dr. Kissinger's negotiating strategy with the Soviet Union on 
strategic arms lJJD.itations. 
Kissinger does not see the possibility -or 8.n internal transfor-
mation o.f Soviet society as likely. - While the elimination o! priTate 
property has •repeated all the evils of the nineteenth centur,y4''1 its 
resu1t has bean to centralize decision making in the bands of a polit-
. ica1 ellte.l? To-Kissinger, the fact that power has .been centralized 
in the Soviet system makes the chances of internal. change all the more 
remote. Because of this centralization, disagreements on policy are 
not likely to be articulated with great T.l.gor1 since the rebellious are 
subjected to confonnist pressures. 
A politica1 evolution that changes the nature of a country's 
system is cne that cannot be imposed .frcn the outside. Idea.lists who 
17) Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice (Harper and Bros.: 
New York, 1960) P• 8 
18) KarrlJ:i Kal.b and Bemard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown & Co.s 
Boston, 1974) P• 60 
19) Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, op.cit., P• 295 
believe that the Soviet system.will change due to our own actions, 
either positive or ne~ative1 do not understand how important the -
structure of t.he international system is in the process of changing 
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the perceptions of revolutionary powers. 20 An acceptance of the 
international system by revolutionary powers can occur without any v/ 
transfonna.tion in the internal domestic structure of that state. 
Kissinger does not believe that we should appl,y Western criterion 
of analyzing econanic indicators and military capabilities in deter-
mining the motivation of the Soviet leadership for pursuing detente. 
The external changes in the international system will make possible 
gradual foreign policy. changes . due to the need for stability. 
Kissinger has always seen ideology as . one of the factors that . 
can delay the process of legitimization in inteniational politics.21 
Ideology is ha.rmfu.l because it leads to irrationality and instability• 
Revolutionary states need an ideology to sustain-their hopes for achieve-
ment, but ideology-.often- blinds them as to the realities-of-the system--
and forces them to regard status quo members of the system as antagonists. 
Ideology fosters conflict because the dispute is not over the distribution 
of benefits in the system but over the system itself. Kissinger seeks 
to create a world order that accepts compromise of differences as an 
indispensable part of the legitimization process. 
The need to bring the Soviet Union into acknowledging that its 
20) ibid., P• 195 
21) Thanas J. Noer1 11Henr,y Kissinger's Philosophy of History'1'1 
Yodern Age, Spring 1975, P• 187 
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best interests can be serv-ed through an acceptance of the l.egit:Unacy of 
the international. system should be the goa.1 of American diplana.cy. 
Cmpromise is llllderm:i.ned_ if the United States follows a bargaiidng 
technique that is infiexible. The greatest obstacle to .American 
success in negotiating with the ScTI.et Union is the presenoe of 
"moralistic formalism• that precludes the possibility that the United 
states could adapt its policies to f'it the circumstances.22 The United 
states wiJ.1 have to lessen its demand~ and adopt negotiating positions 
that tr;r to build stability into the relationship between the United 
States and t.be Soviet Union.23 If the United States makes absolutely 
no concessions from its present position, and even tries to extract 
concessions out or the Sov.l.ets, we will have to risk an increase ill 
eonf'rontations and military expenditures.24 This is undesirable because 
it would revive the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of 
the 19S0 1s. 25 
·The use of analyzing the belief systems of Kissinger and Schlesinger 
in regards to Soviet Communism and detente shows that while both men have 
a distrust of the Soviet· syStem; they dif'fer on whether the nature of the 
. .. 
Soviet system makes detente possible. Schlesinger studies the Soviet 
22) Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, op.cit., P• 2o6 
23) Henry- A. Kissinger, •The Moral Foundations of Foreign Poller', 
Atlantic Community QuarterJ.y, Fall 1975, P• 21 
24) "Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary or State11 1 
Hearin s Before the Comnittee on Foreign Rel.ations of the 
ates Senate, 9 r Congress, st Session, One, (U.S. Goverunent Printing Office: Washington, D.c., 1973) 
PP• 116-117 
2.5) "Detente 1974"·1 Hearings Before the Comnittee on Foreign Rel.a,.. 
tions of the Unit.ed States Senate, 93rd Congress, Second Session, (u.s. Governnent Printing Officer Washington, n.c., 1974) P• 246 
• 
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system as an econanist and concludes that the politicization of the 
econcmy means that all motivations have to be political ones. He is 
concerned that detente could be misrepresented as entente and that the 
American people would cane to fee1 that the maintenance or a strong 
military was no longer necessary. Above all Schl.esinger is cancerned 
that the price of' detente not be too high. 
Kissinger discounts the need for internal. changes on the part of 
the Soviet system as a prerequisite !'or a So'Vi.et acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the internationa1 systED. Soviet leadership has cane to 
accept the status quo. Nations with different nationalities, ideol-
ogies, religions and valnes can share a caumon desire for peace that 
transcends the diTersity tha:t; canplicates the process. 
Two belief systems such as these are perhaps inevitable due to 
the professional .backgrounds of the two Secretaries and their areas of 
expertise. Yet the problflll of coordinating foreign and defense policy 
and developing a nationa1 security strategy in the Ford Administration 
was cc:nplicated by the differing theoretical mode1s and belie! systems 
of the two men, in spite of these general]J" anti~cxmmmist opinions that 
were critical of the Soviet system. Kissinger• s global outlook, . and his 
attempt to create a theory- of peace by which nations can live together 
in harmony eou1d cause him to .overlook changes that could occur in the 
strategic-military bal.ance. And likewise, Sch1esinger•s comparative 
approach to the ~i8 or American national security requirements 
could make him minimize the imporlance of poll ti cal factors and also 
to reassure Soviet leadership of American peacef'ol. intentions. .As 
detente contim.ied. throughout the Nixon era and into the reign of 
33 
President Ford, a debate within American national security policy 
making circles was inevitable~- -with the question being over the means 
by 'Which to p~serve detente in an age of strategic paritz. 
-A 
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Chapter IV 
KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: POLITICAL MULTIPOIARITY V 
STRATEGIC BI POLARITY -
The analysis of the theoretical differences in Secretary o:r state 
Henr;y Kissinger and Secretary of De.fense James Schlesinger's models of 
the international system have shown that dif .f erences existed in regards 
to .the nature o:f the system, the utility of power and the role that the 
United States should play in world affairs and in its rel.a.tions with 
the Soviet Union. What is evident is that a continuing debate over the 
:Uuportance of America's national security policy was to a:nerge. This is 
perhaps best demonstrated in the policies advanced by the two Secretaries. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the most important policy con-
tributions that Kissinger and Schlesinger made in the la.st Republican 
Administration and show that the importance o:f strategic bipolarity in 
1;he international systen was approached .from two entirely different 
perspectives. This is particu1a.r~ true in the case of Dr. Schlesinger• 
whose reign as Secretary o.f Defense was to disturb the Soviet Union. 
Schlesinger: Retargeting Enhances Deterrence 
As Secretary of Defense, Dr. Schlesinger developed a retargeting 
policy for our nuclear weapons arsenal that demonstrates his belief 
that deterrence helps to make detente possible, and that deterrence 
is enhanced through a flexible and diversified nuclear attack force. 
Schlesinger's comparative approach to the military and strategic 
balance caused him to view increases in the Soviet strategic capability 
with alarm. In the light of the Soviets• increased capability• 
Schlesinger observed that a more .fiexible and selective polic7was needed 
in u.s. nuclear strategy than the polic7 of nnru.tual assured destruction" 
(MAD} 1 that had been developed by former Defense Secretary- Robert 
McNamara in the Kennedy and Johnson Admini.st.rations. The Schlesinger 
policy was to gi Te the ~esident a greater fle:xibili ty as to the· 
targeting of u.s. missi1es on targets in the Soviet Union.l Instead 
of targeting only" upon population centers, targeting options would also 
include Soviet military targets. This is the so-called ncounterrorce" 
. · ... 
strategy. 
' Based on the concept that .mutual. deterrence would increa~e if 
the cost of starting an attack was the risk or sufferi.D.g immediate 
attack on popul.a.tion centers, the mutual assured destructi0n poliC)" 
was seen by Schlesinger as incapable of preventing a possible nuclear 
conflict f'ran degenerati.iig into anything other than a masSive -slaughter 
of tb0 cities. MAD had originated in an age of u.s. strategic ~peri­
oi-ity1 but with the advent or miclear parity, a policy change wa~ deaned 
necessary by the Nixon .Administration llJlder Schlesinger's direction. 
The Soviets reacted strongly to the change in American targeting 
strategy. The perception received was that the United States was now 
preparing a .first strike ·· capa.bill ty against Soviet strategic targets. 2 
1) Fiscal Year 1975 Authorization for Military Procurement, 
'Research and DeveloJlllent and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel strengths,, Hearings Before the Camiittee on 
Anned Services of the United states Senate,, 93ro Congress, F:rrst 
Session, February 5,, 1974 (u.s. GOVerm.eiiE Printing Office: 
Washington, n.c. I 197h} P• 7 
2) G. W. 19.thjens,, ttFlexible Response Options", Orbia,, Fall. 197h1 
P. 679 
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'!'he Nixon Admlllistratien received much criticism. .for this retargeting 
change .frcm the Congress. Senators Thmas Jlcintyre (D-New Hampshire) 
and Walter Mondale {n.!ti.nnesota) were espee~ vocal in the critici~ 
of the reta.rgeting cbange.3 Their fear was that the policy change 
in~oduced a des1oabilizing e1ement. into the nuclear anns race. 'l'he 
Soviets cane to distrust Schlesinger because o:f it. 
What counter.force bas done, said Schlesinger, is to enhance 
deterrence by introducing a mechanisn that can C:ontrol a sequence o~ "'~ 
events frail escalating into a nuclear holocaust., by moving away fran 
. . 
the -assured destruction ooncept.4 Schlesinger himself ruled out the 
possibility that the United States would ever strike first, stating 
that the u.s. does not possess the capability to eliminate a1J. of the 
Soviets• missiles in a first strike.5 Its purpose is to strike at. 
strategic Soviet targets if the Soviets should initiate a llldted first 
a.trike, where not all of its strategic arsenal waald be used against 
the United states. 
The purpose of the polic;r change was to al.low nuclear cmflicts 1 
in the event they did occur, to be brought to a more rapid ccool.usion 
with as litt.1e damage as possible.6 Schlesinger stated that the policy 
3) The Congressional Qnart.er]Jr, August 9, 1975, P• 1746 
4) Donald R. Westervedt1 •The Essence o! Armed FutilityW·, 
Orbis, hll 1971', P• 705 
.5) FI 197S Defense Hearings, op.cit., P• 461 
6) ibid., P• 38 
change brought American· strategic poliey into line with that of the 
Soviets.7 
Further criticism of Schlesinger's counterforce strategy was 
36 
based on the fact that it would open the door for a full. scale escala-
tion of anti-ballistic missile systems. With nuclear war having 
bec<1ne more manageable, it also might bec<1ne more thinkable. But 
Schlesinger discounted. these criticisms, again stating that the 
principal aim of counterforce was to enhance deterrence.a The 'MAD 
theory was to be discredited in Schlesinger's view• because it agreed 
that the defense of civil.ian populations was not possible, wheri indeed, 
a counterforce strategy that guaranteed the use of smaller weapons 
would reduce the collateral damage to population centers near military 
targets.9 Overkill could become obsolete as a criticism to limited 
nuclear war with the implementation of counterforce strategies as 
opposed to mutual assured destruction. 
Deterrence would be enhanced under counterforce through the 
creation of numerous strike options for the President because it 
gives the President flexibility in a crisis.lo Crisis decision 
making could be made more manageable, and a potential liJDi ted first 
strike by the Soviets, or even the Chinese, could be deterred through 
7) William R. Cleave and Roger w. Barnett, "strategic Adaptability", 
Orbis, Fall 1974, P• 674 
8) The Congressional Quarterly, August 9, 1975, P• 1746 
9) Juan Cameron, 11'.l'he Rethinking of u.s. Defense", Fortune, 
December 1973, P• 84 
10) "The Schlesinger Gamble", The Econanist, March 2, 1974, P• 18 
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the use of .flexib1e strike options. 
Secretar;y of State Henry Kissinger had written that the possibil:1t7 
of a limited nuclear war, or even the llSe of nuclear weapons for tactical. 
purposes should be planned fer.11 Kissinger himself had come to believe 
that the mut'Ual. assured destruction theories were no longer operable in 
the era. ef strategic parity, and he doubted that the United States had 
enough missiles to bring credibility to the llAD tbesis.12 The American 
SAL'l' I ag:rement with the Soviet Union had covered numerica1 limitations, 
such as the nlJlllber of intercontinenta1 ballistic missiles, subnarine 
launched ballistic missiles and the number of anti-ballistic missles 
allowed in the Ami treaty are good examples. But qualitative increases 
and the problem of the throwweight, or payload that the missi1es carried 
were not. The Soviets could technieally camply with the agreanents 
reached at SALT I without having to worry about placing larger 
missles in silos that were designed for smal.1er ones. '.nle seriousness 
with which the Soviets were to have negotiated the SALT I agreenent 
was e'rl.dent by the fact ~hat they accepted strict limitations on· radar 
developnents.13 Nuclear parity was quantitative, but the possibility 
that z qualitative am.s race coUl.d ensue was a rea1 possibility. 
This was to be a disputed point between Kissinger and Scnleeinger that 
helped to trigger disagreements over SALT I, u.s. arms negotiating 
strategy and the possibility of Soviet violations of the SALT and ABM 
agreements. 
ll)Henr.r Brandon, '!'he Retreat of American Power, (Doub1eday: 
Hew York, 1972:) P• 28 
12)ibid.1 P• 301 
13 )ibid., P• 31.S 
· ns~s A pn.ctit.ianer or MacropollUca 
Eventuall;r, a conflict between Kissinger and Sch1esinger1s 
approaches to national secorit;y policy were bound to merge. Kissinger 
had al.1ra.ys thought of international political problans in term.e of great. 
issues rather than the comparative strategic balance of poNer.lh His 
macropolitical approach is dne to the fact that Kissinger felt that a 
preoccupation wi. th militar;r and strategic bipolarity often causes 
rigidity in the political actions of nations. This rigidity shonld be 
lessened through the acceptance of "World policy and institutions".15 
In this manner security consciousness will al.80 be diminished. 
American foreign policy, ·or necessity, must reconcile the ccneepts- ·-
or st~tegic bipolarity and -political multipolarit.y. The Secretary saw 
this as the major issue confronting American policy makers in the next 
era.16- Ironical:cy, -Kissinger spoke in this instance of what was the · 
1'mdamental point of dispute between himself' and Secretary Schlesinger. 
The resolution of .America's securit:r requirements as opposed to the 
poll t.1ca1 necessi t:r for obta.i ni ng an arms agreement. with the Soviet 
Union was the pr:bna.ry area of dispute between the two. Should the 
thited states accept arms agreanents that will enhance the stability of' 
detente, even thcmgh the:r might put the u.s. in a strategic disadvantage 
14) 'lhe Eeonani.st, October 19, 1974, P• 13 
15) The Econanist, Jul:r 19, 1975, P• 48 
16) .Alastair Buchan, 11 Irony of Kissinger11 1 International 
At'.fairs, Jul.7 1971', P• 373 
. t.o the Soviets? Should the United states attempt to maintain iu nuclear 
capabilities, increase its s·trike options and continue to improve its 
technological advantage over the Soviets at the risk of losing the 
politica.1 relationship it has with the Soviet Union at the present. 
moment.? 
From another persepc'U.Te the Kiesingel'\-Scbl.esinger split can ~ 
a.nalyzed .from a poliey rlewpoint in terms of their perception of what 
.Amari ca' s role in the world shoul.d be at the present tme. Nuclear 
parity bad been found to be the fact by Secretar;r Kissinger when 
President Nixon ordered him to make a strategic assessment of US-Soviet 
strategic capabilities in December of 1968.17 This, canbined with the 
trauma CJf tb.e Vietnam war and the dcnest.ic intern.al problems of the 
United States made the Nixon-Kissinger team fo:mmlate a · new foreign poliey-
for the United states in the early years of the Nixon Administration. 
Kissinger had come to doubt the faith of fonner Secretary of state Dean 
Rusk that .American power was capable of achieving great goa1s, and he 
feared that a continuation of such a poliey would produce a great strain 
on American 1eadersbip and raise public expectations to levels that 
coul.d not be maintained over long periods of time.18 
Kiasinger and Nixon perceived a world in which America's power 
to gain any objecti"Ye was limited by its resources, the will of its 
people and the strength o:f its poll tica1 leadership. Kissinger helped 
17) Jlarvin and Bernard Kalb• Kissinger, (Little, Brown and Coet 
New Yol'k, 1974) pp. 106-107 
J.8) ibid., P• 65 
to replace the old Cold War idealism with a "strong dose of Realpolitik 
and self' interest•.19 
Schlesinger's emphasis on strategic bipolarity leads h:iln to the 
opposite concl.usicm. The stabili t1' of the . international system has been 
threatened by the rentrenchment of American pGWer1 and Schlesinger 
believed that an imbalance eoul.d occur,, in the favor of the Soviet UnioB1 
unless the United States is prepared to take the necessary unilateral. 
measures to reverse this :iJ:nbal.ance. Schlesinger !eared tbB.t •the spectre 
of Soviet !iegemcuyl' presently exists in Europe and that recent increases 
in Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean and the Far East had dramat-
ieally changed the structure of the intemational systm from a military 
standpoint.20 Schlesinger has recently writ.ten that, 
usteadi]J' the entire world is becaning a single strategic 
state ••• (it) can no longer be divided into wide]J' 
separated theaters. tt2l 
Schlesinger's appraisal of the weakness or the American posit.ion 
at this time is based C11 the conviction that it is the United states, 
through its hesitancy and indecision, that is responsible for the 
current tendency of nations to line up against the United states on 
political issues.22 The desire of the United states to reduce its 
19) Brandon,, op.cit., P• 42 
20) James R. Schlesinger, 11Atesting Time for America•·, Fortune, 
February 1976, PP• 7$-76 
21) James R. Schl.esinger• "The Continuing Challenge to America",, 
The Reader's Digest, Ai:ril 1976, P• 63 
22) FY 197) Defense Hearings, op.cit.,, P• 5 
commiiments is dangerou.s becaee of the fact that nat:ims will look 
elsewhere for militar,y assistance and a11:1ance partnerships. 
Fram a. policy ana]J'sis oi' the need i'or nuclear fiex:i.bili ty in 
targeting and the need !or. reaahing political. agreements on nuclear arms 
limitations, it can be seeri that the problem oi' resolv.ing the issue or 
strategic bipo1arity versus politica1 mu1tipolarit7 was one that woa.ld 
eventua.ll;r separate the two men. Kissinger's insistence .that t.his issue 
was the mo~ cracial .:racing American i'oreign policy, was accurate. 'f'he 
two Secretaries developed policies that differed on the conception of 
. . . 
which of the two ideas woo.ld best be able to bring intenmtional 
political stability to the- intemational -system.- ---This -caused them to 
i'avor differing .policies a.S to .. wbat .America's defense · commitments 
should be and whether or ·not deterrence was -·reliable' in the nuclear 
age. 
Kissinger• s desire was· to create a -structure or peace through 
' I 
politica1 arrangements. "This is evident in his -remark that. 
' ' I ' 
n ••• you shou:td be ab°le' to iise' crises to move the world., 
towards the structural solutions that are necessar,y. In 
fact, very o.t'ten crises thanselves ~~ a sympton of the 
need i'or etructural. rearrangements"• '-' 
Kissinger was thinking .in terms o! making a system that is :tnly' 
cooperati Te and cognizant . oi' the i'act that interdepen.dance toJ;"Ces 
naticns to work within worldwide institutions. There exists within 
the international system many areas of conflict, not just two.2k · The 
23) The New York Times, October 131 1974, P• 35 
24) Henry A. Kissinger, •Address to the Sixth Specia1 session 
of the United Nations General Assemb~·, International. 
Organization, Smmler 1974, P• 57k 
prob1em Kissinger was trying to solve, in the words of Premier Ali Jhutto 
of Pakistan, was one or 
"··· evolving the foreign poliey of a country striving 
to build a new worl.d order 1 not. on the ashes of war 1 
but in times of pea.cen.25 
In the Xiasinger view 1 poll tica1 mu1tipolarit.y is potenti~ 
more dangerous than strategic bipolarity because of the fact that 
political disagreaaents between sub-systans could lead to a polari-
zation of the international system into the u.s. and Soviet camps. 
Nations could ~e their resources as pell tieal weapons. 26 _ The 
Kissinger concern for p~venting the politically- mu1tipolar systm 
' fran breaJdng down into two camps contrasts sharply 111 th Schlesinger• s 
concern for establishing mechanisms that can prevent a non-cooperatiTe 
world from destroying itself. 
Foreign and _defense policy cou1d be expected to eventua:J.ly be at 
odds. strategic bipolarity and political m.ultipolarit;r, as concepts 
with llhich American nationai se~ty decision makers most .deal, . were 
can:plicated at this time. because the United States was following a 
defense policy that encouraged increasing nuclear strike options and 
improving u. s. technol.f)gica1 capac1.ty 1 while Secretar;r Ki_ssinger ~ s 
iD. the process or negotiating a .SALT II agret111en~ that hopeful.ly'would 
c0nclude with as much success as SALT I. At the same time, the 
25) "Kissinger: Positivel,y NegatiTen 1 Far Ea.st Econanic Review, 
November 15, 1974, P• 574 · 
26) Hen.17 A. Kissinger, "The Washingt.on Energy Confeerence: 
The .American Challenge", The Atlantic Community Quarlerq, 
Spring .1974, P• 25 
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.American public was to believe that detente had t~ arr::l.ved.1 and t.hat 
there was no need for the United St.ates to lllldertake the active defense 
o.f nations, either through direct involvanent or military assistance. 
The paradox of seeing the President of the United States sign a SA.LT I 
agreement with the Soviet Uni.en and embracing detente1 and at the same 
time order the mining o.f Haiphong Harbor ::lm North Vietnam seemed incon-
sistent to the .American people, and a neo-isolatienist trend ensued. 
How is detente to be maintained and what are its limitations were 
to be issues that split the Ford Administration in its developnent o.f 
a nationa1 securit7 policy. The proper definition of what is the 
national security in an age or detente, and how it shoul.d be de.fined 
in canparative or no:rma.tive tems were issues that eventua.ll,y had to 
be resolved. '.nlese issues were lefi unanswered, until the President 
saw that his two Secretaries were working at cross purposes. 'nle 
substantive issues on which Kissinger and Schlesinger disagreed llill 
prove that the coordination of defense and foreign policy is made 
dif.f'i.cul.t unl.ess decision makers make efforts to develop commcn 
perceptions of what is at stake and what choices will enhance the 
national security need of the United St.ates •. 
Chapter V 
KISSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: ISRAEL AND THE OCTOBER WAR OF 1973 
Any two national decision makers 1 when confronted with an issue 
that demands the immediate attention of the President, bring into the 
national security decision making process perceptions about the issue 
that can influence the recommendations they make to the President. The 
ideological orientation of the decision maker, his belie.f system and 
theoretical model of the international systan and his own personal values 
often cause him to think in terms of the global implicatims o! a dispute 
at the sub-syste:n level. 
Such was the case in the developnent of the Nixon Administration's 
policy towards resupplying Israel during the 1973 October War. Secretarj' 
of state Kissinger am Secretary o.f Defense Schlesinger were the primary 
decision makers for the United States besides the President, during this 
crisis. The stuczy- of the Kissingel'-Schlesinger relationship during the 
1973 October War is important because: 
1) it was a crisis situation and could give one clues as to possible 
relationships between the two Secretaries in future crises; 
2) it gives us the chance to examine the nature of the Kissinger-
Schlesinger relationship from the standpoint o.f which Secretary 
had the most influence with the President, which will enable us 
to understand why Schlesinger came to protest American national 
security policies in the next two years; 
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3) it. gives us the opportunity of examining the charge that Secretary 
Schlesinger deli'b-erately violated orders in regards to the resupply-
ing or the Israelis, and the charge that Kissinger, in fact. was the 
one who was really responsible for t.he resupply' dela;rs. 
Any President mast have a high degree of confidence in his 
cabinet members and advisors during a:rry crisis decision. The 
expertise of the meni>ers of the foreign and defense bureaucracies 
o.f.'ten forces the President to rely on their knmr1edge in the making 
of nationa1 policy. According to Yorton· Halperin, a fonner aide to 
Heney Kissinger when he was on the Naticnal. Security Council staff 1 
11
'.Polfer gravitates to those E-1~~d:~1who are willing to make decisions and 11 ve with the results"'• 
Henry Kissinger had gained the confidence of President Nixon due 
to the fact that by October o:f 1973 he had worked with Nixon for over 
four ;years and had the President's confidence. As NSC advisor to the 
President, Kissinger held thirty-seven NSC meetings in 1969. In his 
first. year as Secretary of state, however, Kissinger held only f01Jl" 
NSC meetings.2 Schlesinger b~came Secretary or Defense in the spring 
of 1973. With Kissinger holding fewer NSC meetings with Schlesinger 
as Secretary of Defense, it wol11d seem probable that Kissinger had a 
very daninant position in the control of infonnation that President 
Nixon received on national security matters. This is very important 
to l"Elllember when an evaluation of responsibility for the resupply 
1) Mort.on H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policz, 
(The Brookings Institutionz Washington, b.c., 197h) p. 220 
2) The New York Times, December 24, 1973, P• h 
dela;rs is to be made. 
Secretary of Defense Schl.esinger bad little influence with the 
President at this time. With the reputation or being a bard-nosed and 
no-nonsense indi'V'idual, Sch1esinger had little desire for making friends 
through persuasion, was often at odds with many or his colleagues. 
Schlesinger's problem was to gain access to the President in a wa:r in 
which Kissinger could not control the means or commilnication with the 
Chief Executive. 
Schlesinger consequently caµld not be expected to have the same 
fieccibility as did Kissinger in conceiving policies, because of the 
cammnnication problan. Although having served for four yeS.rs in' the 
Nixon Administration in a variety or positions, f'ran Atomic Energy 
Camnissioner to the Director or Central Intelligence, Sch1esinger did 
not have a close working relationship with the President.3 In .the 
' 1973 October war, Schlesinger could not be expected, f'ran an analysis 
or his relationship lli. th Kissinger and Nixon, to have much input on the 
substance or policy. 
A further background in the study of the Kissingel'-Schlesinger 
relationship in this instance should be prefaced by the examination of 
hOll' the ccnmun:ications between the two Secretaries had been established 
in 1973. Upon becaning Secretary of State, Kissinger began a series or 
contacts rl th Schlesinger in which they would try to see each other for 
breakfast •at least once a week•1.4 
3) •Schlesinger on Defense", Aviation Week and Space Technology•, 
October 211 19741 P• 10 
4) The New York Times, Decmber 24, 19131 P• h 
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They also cmmwrl.cated by phone quite frequently. This c(llllllUllicatian 
continued for nearly two years until an open hostility between the two 
Secretaries became apparent. to alJ.. These sessi.ans would appear to be 
ones in which the Secretary o! State was to serve as a means by which 
the President cou1d convey to Schlesinger arry- new policy decisions and 
in which Kissinger a1me could control Schlesinger's inputs as to crit-
icisms that national security decision makers should consider. The 
point is that Kissinger daninated the national security decision making 
.Process by limiting Schlesinger's opportunities for criticism through 
holding inf'requent NSC meetings and also daninating the access to the 
President. 
The outbreak of the 1973 October war caught both the Israelis and 
the Americans by total surprise. Secretary of state Kissinger stated 
that both the American and the Israeli intelligence networks had reported 
one week prior to the Arab attacks that there was no chance or war 
breaking out in the near .f'uture.:5 On~e war did break out, Kissinger was 
directed by President Nixon to organize the Washington Special Action 
Group, WSAG, which was responsible for making foreign policy decisions 
for the United States during the October war. The WSAG group consisted 
or Kissinger and Scblesinger1 tm.dersecretary or state Joseph Sisco, 
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, CIA Director William Colby and 
5) Avi Shlaim, "The faillU'e of National Intelligence Estilllates: 
The Case of the Yam Kippar War", World Politics, April 1976, 
P• 361 . 
the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs or Staff, Adniiral Thomas Moorer.6 '!'he 
day a.ft.er the outbreak of the. war Secretary of Derense Sch1esinger and 
Admiral Moorer met with top Israeli experts to begin a determination of 
the ability or the Israelis to withstand the Arab attacks.7 
Israel Wa.s in a strategically poor position. The Syrians had 
crossed "tihe Israeli def'ense lines on the Golan Heights and the Egyptians 
had moved across the Suez Canal to its east bank.8 No one in the Adm.in-
istration .believed that a massive airlift. to Israel was necessary at this 
time. The u.s. held the conviction that in spite or the strategic sit~ 
tion, Israel would easi'.cy win the war, and the u.s. woUl.d not _have to 
risk .resupplying the Israelis ii' they needed spare parts and amnmni tion. 9 
The policy or the Administration between the day or the outbreak or the 
war and the day on which the Soviets rirst began to supp~ the Syrians 
and the Egyptians was to give the Arab block the impression that the 
United states was trying to remain neutra1. '!'his was . the so called _ 
"1ow pro!':Ue" policy of . the United States.~ ___ 
Against this background the accusations that Secretary of Defense 
6) Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger, (Little, Brown and Co.r 
Boston, 1974) P• 461 
7) The New York Ti.mes, October 7, 19131 P• l 
8) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit, P• h64 
9) William B. Quandt, "Kissinger Clld the .Ara.Wsraeli Disengagement 
Agreement", Journal of International Affairs, Spring 1975, p. 31 . 
lD) Isslie H. ·Gelb, "Kissinger and Schlesinger Deny October Ri.rt.11 1 
The New York Times, June 231 1974, P• 10 
Schlesinger impeded the delivery of ams shi}:Jllents to the Israelis shoul.d 
be noted. According to this account, the Secretary of Defense obstructed 
t.he shipnent o:f' pbantan. jets to Israel and delAyed the chartering of 
ci"Vilian pl.a.nes to Israel :f'or resupp:cy purposes.ll Schlesinger report-
edly refused to meet with Israeli contact to the United States during 
this period, Simi.cha Dinitz,· on October 10th for the purpose of discuss--
ing the matter of t .rans:f'erring military aid t.o Israel. Schlesinger was 
said t.o have disagreed with Kissinger over the chartering of twenty 
civilian planes to Israel for the purpose of !'lying emergency supplies 
to them.12 Schlesinger was al.so said -to have told Dini ts that the 
United States could fly supplies only as far as the Azores Islands on · 
October llth1 .iafter-'haT.b:lg reoei"f'ed"'WOrd .£rta. Kissinger ' t.hat ·the United 
states::-,ras was to use civilian charters for the resupp:cy effort. After 
this last bit of intransigence on the part of Schlesinger, President 
· Nixon was to have ordered a meeting on Saturday October 13th in which 
he personally ordered for the use of C.5-A military transport -planes for 
the resupp~ effort, and that they were to bypass the Azores and go 
directly to Israei.l3 
Both Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of -Defense Schle-
singer denied this account. In doing so they both aclmowledge that 
Schlesinger was not in the position of being able to impede the ·. 
ll) Ka.Th and Kalb, op.cit., PP• 46&-468 
12) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit., p. 472 
13) Kalb and Kal.b, op.cit., PP• 476-477 
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implementation of u.s. policy at this time because of the daninance of 
Kissinger. Sch1esinger stood by the story that he did not receiTe any 
authorization from the White House to send military aircra.fi to Israel 
until. the mom.ing o:f October 13th, and that whil.e he did try to get 
American civilian charters to transfer the goods and supplies to Israel,. 
American companies refused to cooperate.11' The delays were a part of 
national policy. While the United States agreed to supp~ munitions to 
the Israelis, the Militar;r Airlii't Camnand, (MAC) was not te be used. 
The pri"nlte sector re.fused to cooperate with the Pentagon• because of 
the :fact that charter companies feared the prospect o:f reprisals by 
the Arabs. 
Both Kissinger and Schlesinger were anxious to "break the Soviet 
stranglehold", in parts o:f the Midd1e East.1S American policy has 
already been said to have been predicated on the hope that the United 
states would not have to resupp~ the Israelis in the October war. It 
was not until October loth that the Soviets began to resupply the 
Syrians and the Egyptians. .American policy during the period of 
October 10th to October 12th can be said· to be that of attempting to 
get ciTi.lian charter canpanies, through the Pentagon, to get the 
supplies sent to Israel. The Americans still had the hope that they 
would not have . to use military aircraft to send the supplies. 
lh) J. L. Schecter• "Schlesinger and the Resupp~ Crisis"• 
Time, July 1, 19741 P• 33 . 
l!)) Leslie H. Gelb, aschlesinger for De:fense: Defense :for Detente•, 
'.lbe New York T:i:mes Magazine, August 4, 1974, P• 43 
The u.s. hope for a negotiated cease 1'ire is another factor in 
the ref'uta.ticm of the story that Schlesinger is to blame for the 
resupply delays. On October 12th the Israelis agreed to U.S. proposal 
for a •stand in placeu cease fi.re.16 The Soviets claimed that the 
Egyptians would also accept it., if neit!ler the United States or the 
Soviet Union took the issue to the United Nations. But when Sadat of 
Egypt rejected the proposal, it became clear to President Nixon that 
the chances :for a negotiated .cease fire had vanished, and so the next 
morning he ordered the military airlift to Israel. 
Was Schlesinger the one who was stalling on the anne shipments 
to Israel-,·-or was it Ni:xon--and Kissinger? -Nixon and Kissinger had the 
better motivation far stalling on the resupply effort, and it was 
Kissinger, not Schl.esinger who was in charge ef the WSAG group coordi-
nating u.s. poll.CJ" at this time. - The .American 1eadership feared the 
possibility o:f an Arab oil embargo, · and hoped to end the war with a 
negotiated cease fire before there was a need to resupply Israel.- -
Kissinger himself should bear the majority o:f the responsibillty for 
the decisions that were made, because of the fact that he did control 
the WSAG group and for the fact that President Nixon WB.8 preoccupied 
with the resignation ef Vice-President Agnew and his own Watergate 
difficulties. A more believable account would have Kissinger 1U1ing 
Schlesinger to take the criticism !rem the Israelis wbi.le he was 
ma.king a political. reassessment of the situation in hopes of aITiving 
1.6) Quandt, op.cit. 1 P• 37 
'4· 
at an end to the conflict through negotiai;ion.17 
.Ainerica's resupp~ effort was pieomeal. and hal.fhearted at first 
because this was national poliey. Secretary of State Kissinger had a 
very real concern that the October War could escalate into a con.f'rm-
taticm between t.he United States and the Soviet Union. Kissinger 
himself rehsed a military airlii"t to Israel and organized a plan :ll1 
which the United States would send supply pl.anes cmly as far as t.he 
Azores, because he wanted Soviet-American cooperation during this 
crisis.16 A review of the criticism from Congress towards t.he Admin-
istration at this time shows that it was the entire Adminstration that 
was being subjected to Congressional. attacks. Sena.tor Henry M. Jackson 
(D-Wash.) accused the Administration of 
• •••• wit~o1ding the means of self~efense from a friend 
at war,. 9 , 
Secretary of State Kissinger's concern during the October War ot 
1973 was to preserve the stability of detente. 'nle war between the 
Israelis and the Arabs threatened to destroy the international. system 
by forcing the United St.ates and the Soviet Union to back each side. 
This was the first real test of detente. .American policy was developed 
at this time in a manner that meant to localize the conflict and preven1; 
17) Leslie H. Gelb• "Kissinger and Schlesinger Den,- October Ri.rt.11 1 
'l'be New York Tines, June 2.31 1974, P• 1D 
18) Edward hlttwalc and Walter Le..quer, •Kissinger and the YClll 
Kippur War•, Ccmunentarz, September 19741 PP• .36-38 
19) Time, October 221 197.3, P• SJ. 
the superpowers :firm reaching a showdown from which escalation of the 
connict . woa.l.d most probab:cy result. 
While Kissinger and Scb1esinger can be said to have been in agree-
•ent over the goal e:f preventing u. s. invo1vemen.t in the war, ~ 
disagreed over whether the Soviet Unien would actuallJr' intervene. 
President Nixon ordered Kissinger to take charge o:r the u.s •. response 
to the Soviet threat that they wou1d unilate~ intervene in the 
war by placing a peace keeping force in the area. The Soviets had put 
four of their airborne divisions on alert and bad aent five transport 
ships to the Mediterranean. President Nixon had opposed using a big 
povrer peace keeping ferce in settling the conflict, bu.t Premier Breshnev 
of the Soviet lhion asked Nixon to consider a joint u.s.-USSR peace 
keeping force that would be sent to Egypt. Bresbnev stated that i:f the 
u.s. didn't accept. the plan, the Soviets might intervene unilateraJJ.y.20 
Nixon erdered the Secretary of Defense to alert a11 u.s. forces 
stationed around the world upon hearing Bre8hneT's statement. SecretarT 
Sch1esinger was responsible for the implementation ot the alert, ~ 
he disagreed with Nixon and Kissinger's appraisal. that Breshnev should 
be taken aerious:cy-. Schlesinger was quoted as saying that 
•r think the probability of So~lt forces being on rcute was 
considered b;y' sane to be iawn. 
Whether the aendillg of' the SaYiet t.ran15Port ships to the 
Vediterranean and the placing of four SGViet airborne divisi0Jl8 en 
20) Kalb and Kalb, op.cit., P• 489 
21) KaJ.b and Kalb, op.cit., P• 1'97 
alert 'RS' Bl! indication of possible Soviet intervention or not• Hixon 
and Kissinger were prepared ~or (-1ihe··.possibW.t,T-•' Kissinger's efforts 
to preTent the big powers f'rca involving thEl!lBelves militarily- in the 
October War is an indieatien that he believed that the future of detente 
could well rest on the ability ef' the United states and the Soviet Union 
to pacify the ei tuat.ion. Schlesinger was t.hi nld ng in tems or capabil• 
ities and strategies. 
Tile two Secretaries al.so dilf ered on their own personal. handling 
of Western E uropean reaction to the American resupply effort. "nie 
Europeans opposed the use of NATO facilities for the resupply e!fort;.22 
Sch1esinger criticized West Germany for taking a •separate line11 from 
that of the United States in the crisis, and specif':ical.JJ" referred 1;o 
West Germany's call on the u.s. to stop loading American supplies and 
weapons for Israel on to Israeli freighters at the u.s. forces port in 
Bremerbaven.23 
.. 
Later, in the month of November, Sch1osinger 11~t with West German 
Defense Minister Georg Leber and together they- W1>rked out an arrangement 
that provided that in the !ttture United States llilitar.r equip1ent would 
not be sent :f'rm West Germany on Israeli ships. 24 Schlesinger had ~en 
able to reach a C<Bpramise w.l th the West German, and did so in a n:r 
that might help the United States in ease of another conflict in the 
Middle Ea.st. Sch1esinger1s concern for NA.TO and the structure of the 
22) Na.da.v Safram, •rnie War and the Fllture of the Arab-Israeli 
~ct•, Foreign .lf'fairs, January 1974, P• 224 
23) '!'he Hew Yerk Times, October 27, 1973, P• 1 
~) The New ·York Times, NoYember 101 1973, P• 13 
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Alliance were important considerations in this matter. The perception 
of Western cooperation was deemed important. 
This contrasts sharply with Secretary Kissinger's handling of 
the Western European problem. Kissinger's criticism of NATO was very 
heated, and he is said to have been •disgusted" with the failure of NATO 
to back the United stat.es in the crisis. 25 The Europeans apparently 
had little desire to see their own econcxnies hurt due to a possible 
West European-u.s. linkage during the resupply effort, a.f'ter which the 
Arab nations would place an oil embargo on them as well as the Americans. 
European hostility to Kissinger continued for the next two months, in 
spite of the fact that the Americans and West Germans had reached an 
agreement on resupplying Israel in November. The Europeans were ex-
tremely resentf'ul. of Kissinger's criticisms as late as November 29th 
of that year.26 Kissinger had less of a concern lli th the strength of 
the NATO Alliance, and concerned himself with preventing a Soviet-
American con.frontation. 
Secretary Kissinger's primary role during the 1973 October War was 
that of "crisis manager". 27 As a crisis manager, he has be~ shown to 
be concerned with three specific si tua ti ons in which it was proved that 
Kissinger was more concerned 1d th preserving the "structure of peace" and 
preventing a Soviet-American confrontati~n in the area than he was with 
reaching a rapid conclusion to the conflict by resupplying Israel when it 
25) The New York TinEs, October 31, 1973, P• l 
26) The New York Times, November 291 1973, P• L3 
27) Roger Morris, "Kissinger and the Brothers Kalb", 
The Washington Uonthly, July/August 1974, P• 55 
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needed weapons and arms. Kissinger, and al.so former President Hixon, 
saw the October War of 1973 as a potentiall;r destabilizing event f'or the 
system. The .future of detente, aeeording to the Kissinger logic, was 
threatened by an overt show er .American support to Israel. The resupply 
dela;ys were meant to a1law the thited States to maintain a 1ow profil.e 
during the conflict. The fear of Soviet interventietn led to a worl.dwide 
alert or all American forces. The failure to consult with West Gennany 
and other NA.TO coantries on the resupp)J' ef'f'ort and . the a1ert was 
moti nted from a fear that the:r. wou1d not support such a policy 1 !2 
the United states must go ahead without their consent. Kissinger's 
desire was to preserve the structure of peace, by using peace itself 
as the legitimating principle that wou1d force nations to recognize 
that it was in their best interest to preserve the st.atua quo.26 
Secretary Schlesinger's concern during the 1973 October War was 
that of impl.ementing the Nixon-Kissinger policies and maintaining a 
strong Western Alliance. The study of policy making at the individual 
level during the 1973 war for both Kissinger and Schlesinger proved that 
Schlesinger at this time was not in a position to chal.l.enge Administra-
tian policy effectively,, because or the dcminace or the Secretary of' 
State in the formulation of' American national security p~liey. 
Schlesinger's behavior during the resupply crisis contrasts with 
Kissinger in that he doubted that the Soviets would intervene in the 
conflict and in that he was ~ble to re-establish positive contac:ts with 
28) Graham Allison, "Cold Dmrn and the Mind of Henr;r Kissinger", 
The Washington lfonthly, March 19741 P• 4S · 
our Western European al.lies lll11Ch easier than Kissinger. 
Secretar;Y Schlesinger found that ii" he was to have a say in the 
general. direction or .American _national seen:rit.;r policy, he wml.d ba"Ye 
to becc:.me mcire wca1 in his cC111111.ents and i:e rhaps even risk a confron-
tation with Kissinger. Because Schlesinger's base of support was still 
quite sbal10lf1 he c0l11.d not risk a showdown with Kissinger. Btlt. it is 
clear that as Schlesinger• s prestige grew, and as he became to be seen 
as a threat to Kissinger's influence, a potential showdown might occur. 
A break with Kiasinger would have to come on a. policy that covered the 
whole aeope or America's attempts to build a positive relationship 
with the Soviet Union. Detent.e, and the means by which to preserve it, 
would be at the center or the controversy. 'lbe study or the Kissingel'-
Schlesinger relationship during the period of the October War or 1973 
shows that Kissinger• s influence would sooner or l.&ter be challenged 
and that detente weuld most probab~ be the issue that separated \hem. 
Chapter VI 
KJ:SSINGER AND SCHIESINGER: SALT, DETENTI AND NEGOTIATIHG STRATEGY 
The resignation or Richard Nixon frcn the Presidency placed f'omer 
Congressman Gerald R. Ford in the White House. President Ford continued 
to have Secret.a.ry of state Kissinger be the National Security Cound.l. 
advisor to the President. Initial.]J' there was some doubt as to whether 
the President was going to retain Dr. Schlesinger as Secretary or 
Defense,, but by the end or 1974 the President bad decided that Schl.e-
singer was to remain as Defense Seoreta17.1 
As the year 1975 progressed, a deterioration in the relationship 
between the two Secretaries was evident• and deep philosophical. disagree-
. ments about u.s. nationa1 security policy were at the heart or the 
controversy. 'l'he major substantive issue around which this disagreement 
came to a head was that or American negotiating strategy with the Soviet 
Union. In a broader sense, it .was the definition of' detente and the 
means by which to preserve it that brought on the schim between the twe 
Secretaries. Both the Congress and the public came to wonder which or 
the two Secretaries was actual.ly enunciating the policy or the Admi.nia-
tration. 
'nle fact that Secretary of' St.ate Kissinger dominated the means or 
access to the ?resident on national. security affairs through being the 
NSC advisor helped to aggravate the crisis, but that in its~lt was not 
the cause or the controversy. Charges and countercha.rges ran through 
1) The ?lew York Times, December 29, 197h, P• lJ 
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the state Department and the Pentagon that tended to shaw the two 
departments as antagonists. Eventua1l7 the Pentagori ~leased a study 
that questioned the whole concept of detente, which will be elaborated 
on in the next chapter. 
The problem of anal~ing the substantive differences on policy 
between Kissinger and Schlesinger, and relating them to their awn 
belief systems, is complicated by the fact that the Ford Administration 
refused to acknowledge the existence of the split. President Ford 
initially said that the removal of Schlesinger was motivated by a desire 
to 11 get his own team", but he later was forced to admit that serious 
policy differences did enter into his decision to replace Dr. Schlesinger 
with Donald Rumsfeld. 2 
The substantive differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger 
conform to the basic models that were developed for each Secretary in 
the study of their belief systems and perceptions of issues. '.lbe means 
by which to maintain detente was the .fundamental issue in the Kissinger-
Schlesinger cont roversy. Schlesinger maintained that detente could only 
be perserved through the continuing existence of a strong u.s. military 
establishment that might have to increase its potential if it was to be 
a credible deterrent. In this way, argued Schlesinger, the Soviets would 
not use detente to their own advantage. Kissinger placed less faith in 
deterrence, because he believed that political issues are best resolved 
through political processes. Kissinger was disinclined to accept 
2) •Foi-d Finally Admi.ts Tension led to Shake Up", '.lbe New York 
Times, November 16, 1975, IV, P• 2 
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Schlesinger's arguments that the United states should increase its 
strategic capabilities through technological and targeting .flexibilit7. 
The major sub st.anti ve issues on which Kissinger and Schlesinger 
disagreed .will be found to center on u.s9 negotiating strategy at SALT. 
The issues to· be discussed in this chapter will bez 
1) The Cruise Missile, 
2.) 'l'b.e Soviet Backfire Bomber, 
3) MrRV•S1 
4) The Question of Possible Soviet Violations of the agreE111.ents. 
other issues that also separated Kissinger and Schlesinger were 
whether the United states should send Pershing Missiles to Israel, the 
status of our position on troop reductions at the MBFR talks in Vienna, 
and on the claim that Secret&r)" Kissinger withheld information !'rem the 
Pentagon on the Sinai agreenent that was negotiated in September of 1975. 
Background: The Need to Finalize a SALT II Accord 
A very ~ concern of the Ford Administration was that. a SALT II 
agreEment be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union 
based on the fonnulation reached at Vladivostok in November of 1974. 
Schlesinger's presence and vocal criticism of the tendency of the Soviets 
. to increase the thromreight capacit7 of their missiles was a contributing 
factor in the tension that came to the surface between the two Secretaries. 
The Soviets were concerned that Sch1esinger's retargeting policies and 
his ardent exhortations to keep America's strategic capabilities on a 
par with the Soviets might mean that American policy was changing awa.y-
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fran the previous hannony -that had been experlenced with President Nixon.3 
The Soviets also expressed fears that Scb1esinger had prepared fust 
strike options that could be utilized in •selective strike• situations. 
The Administration, however, desired to reach an agrement as soon as 
possible. Schlesinger warned that it would be better if the SALT Il 
:f'lnal.ization was postponed until af'ter the Presidential election, so 
that a canprehensive agreement cou1d be reached rather than an artificia1 
one that coul.d be reached Tery easily and be interpreted ambiguously.4 
The presence o:f Schlesinger was seen by scme observers as the major 
obstacle to the completion o:f an ams agreement with the Soviets at SALT 
II.5 In specifics, Scb1esinger•s presence complicated possible negotia.-
tioos on the cruise missile, backfire bcmber and MI:RV•s. The .American 
lead in crnise :missiles was the prlJnar.T area of dispute. 6 
The Cndse Missil.e 
The Soviets desired a llmitatiOID. on the nmi>er of cruise missiles 
that the United States could deploy on its manned banbers. Defense 
Secretary Schlesinger was adamantly opposed to negotiating away the 
cruise missile advantage, maintaining that it was a "bargaining chip" 
3) •Schlesinger Hit for Noel.ear War Tallc", Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press, Aug. 61 197S, P• 3 
4) George c. Wilson, "Schlesinge~ssinger Schism Deep•, 
'l'he Washington Poet, November 31 197$, P• 12 
.5) Joseph Kraft, "'l'he Crumbling Administration" 1 The Washington 
Post", November 4, 1975, P• lla -
6) Dana Adams Schnidt, •F.lring Leaves Kissinger Without Cabinet 
Challanger11 , 'nle Christian Science Yonitor, November h, 197S, P• 4 
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for the United St.ates.7 Schlesinger argued that it was :impossible to 
check the nURber or c:nrl.se missiles that both the u.s. and the Soviets 
bad. Secretary Kissinger• s position was that the United states might 
have to l:bdt its deployment of the crnise missile as a necess&r1' con-
cession ill order to reach a comprehensive agreement. 8 Dr. Schlesillger's 
opposition to :including the cruise missile in the 2400 level limit on 
strategic delivery vehicles was another point or disagreement. 
Sch1es:inger stated that it was not an ICBll because it stayed within 
the atmosphere when in flight. 
The Backfire Banber 
The possession by the Soviet Union of the backfire bomber was 
anather area •f disagreenent between Ki~usinger and Schlesillger. 
Secreta.17 Kissinger wanted the Soviet backfire bomber to be excluded 
fran the 2400 strategic delivery vehicle limitation that was agreed to, 
but Dr. Schlesinger.believed that the backfire should be included in 
the limitation.9 Sch1esillger was also crltica1 or its exclusion from 
the strategic delivery vehicle limit because or the fact that the 
Soviets wanted a limitation put on u.s. cruise missile, and he felt 
7) Clarence A. Robinson• •Cabinet Shifts Vay Speed SALT", 
.lT.iation Week and Space Technology, November 10, 1975, P• 12 
8) The Lc>ndon Economist, November 8, 1975, P• 16 
9) The Congressional. Quarterl,y, November 8, 1975, P• 2349 
10 
that to give the Soviets the adnmtage in ~h categories 110ul.d be lUildse. 
A trade oft would have been the more desirable alternative. Secretary' 
nssinger -,.2:.felt that to limit the backfire, along with a refusal on 
the part of the United states ta cansider putting a limit on the cruise 
missile caul.d lead w a possible breakdown of the negotiatlgns. 
It is clear]J" evident that from the Soviet perception of what was 
at stake 1 a Scbl.esinger remcJYal woul.d .f'acili tate a SALT Il agreement.. ll 
This perception was to continue throughout the Kissinger-Sch1esinger 
dispute, and the Soviets would not soften their position. 
One of t.be most intense points of disagreement between Secretar;y 
Kissinger and SeeretB.17 Schlesinger was that of the developnent and 
counting of the MI RV (Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-Entr;r 
Vehicles) systems of the United states and the Soviet Union. Once 
again the disagreanent shows how Kissinger was vrary of how an7 new 
recbnological developments coal.d upset the detente relationship and 
the status of the negotiations, while Schlesinger was concerned with 
hmr techno1ogical developnents could upset the strategic balance 
between the nperpowers. 
The Soviets, according to reports by Secretar.r Schlesinger, had 
begun a missile testing program in the suraer of 1973 that danonstrated 
10) Tad Szulc, nThe Firings and Foreign PoliC,-1 The New Republic, 
November JS. 1975, P• 8 · 
11) Gu;J" Halverson, 11Schl.esinger Ouster Boosts SALT Prospects", 
The Christian Science Monitor, November S, l97S, P• ll 
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l2 that theT did possess a MIRV capabiliv. Sch1esinger belieTed that 
. this new devel.opRent radicall.7 cbaliged iihe overall balance that had been 
negQtiated at SALT t.13 Secretary Kissinger cl.id not• arguing that the 
United states already possessed a "nuc1ear su:tficienc;;y" that woul.d more 
than o!f'set any new MIRV technology that was developed by the Soviets. 
The disagreement centered on the number of' warheads that the United 
States should have that wou1d be an.ed 1ll. th KIRV•s. SecretarJ' Scblasinger 
believed that the United states should have at least a wo to one advan-
tage in ICBM•s that were am.eel with JIIRV's beea115e of' the fact that the 
Soviets possessed a decided advantage in the 'throwweigh'- advantage or 
its miasiles.14 Secretary Xissinger deilied that this was a · major issue, 
and repeated his warnings tha.t such demands wonld only serve to undennine 
detente and threaten the stability of the international. s.rstm. 
Schlesinger at one ti.me was also opposed to an increase in the numerica1 
limitation on Soviet MIRV•s aboTe the level ef 1320.15 The method of 
co1D1ting MrRV•s was also at issue• with Kissinger favoring possible 
revisions and Schlesinger opposed to lll1Y change in the counting qstem.16 
12) U.S. Hews and Wor1d Report.• Kay 1:J1 1974. P• .38 
13) "Ford's Costly Pttrge"• ~' .NoTanber 17~ 1975, P• 20 
lb.} Joseph 'Framm1 "Ki-asi.nger-Schlesinger Feud11 1 U.s~ Hews 
and World Report., ~ 221 19741 P• 22 
15)Peter Goldman and 'nlc:aas DeFrank, "Ford's Big Shu.ff1e• 
Newsweek, Hovmber 17, 1975 
16) The Landon Economist, Novamver 8• 1975, P• 16 
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Possible Soviet Violations 
Part ef the reason wh;r Secretary Schlesinger was at odds with 
Secretary Kissinger was because of the ambigui t;r 0£ the SALT I text 
and the fact that it all.awed the SGT.i.ets ·a considerable degree ot 
latitUde in the interpretation of the agreeirumt.17 Froa a technical 
standpoint, t.he Soviets had not violated certain provisions o:f the 
agreement, but t.he lR>rding was so loose as t.o allar for T.i.ola:tictns or 
the spirit of the agreement, wbcih Schlesinger apparentl:y had decided 
were quite numerous. 
One o:f the violations of the SALT I agreement that bothered 
Schlesinger was that or the ~~struction of il.liga1 ICBM silos and 
up to 200 •command and control centers" that _had been discovered .:f'r<a 
the photos given by'·u.s. intelligence satellites.18 Schlesinger was 
critical of Kissinger in this regard because Kissinger would not 
present these violations to the Sorl.ets. 
One of the violations or the SALT I agreement that was of 
particular brportance in the Kissinger-Schlesinger feud was that or 
the Soviet testing of radar equipnent. The Soviets bad began to place 
19 . its SA-.5 radar on a range on Kamchatka. The Soviets reportedly had 
17) •Schlesinger Hits Violations of SALT, Posture Trend111, Aviation 
Week and Space Tecbnol!Q', December 1, 1975, P• 21 
18) Drew' Middleton, "Schlesinger's Views of Kissinger Described", 
The New York Times, Ncwemver 8, 197.5, P• 2 
19) Clarence A. Robinson, •Kissinger Deliberately Concealing SALT 
Viola~ions, Zumwal.~ Claims", A'rl.ation Week and Space Technology:, 
December 8, 197.5, P• 14 . 
placed testing devices in the modes or their .AB)( missi1es. The testing 
began in April of 1975 and was to have been used to track incoming 
missiles. 20 Secretary or Stat.a Kissinger later said that it was decided 
not to bring the radar issue to the attention of the Soviets because 
the United states did not want to revea1 the source of its intelligence.21 
He did not deny that the Soviets used the radar. A.rt.er his dismissal, 
Secretary Schlesinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and stated that the Soviet radar testing was a direct 'ri.olation 
of the SALT I agreement. 2~ 
Secretary or Defense Schlesinger• s criticism of the SALT I agrement 
that W'U"negotiated is .:furt;her demonstrated by the fact that the agreement 
did not limlt the size of missiles that the Soviets could deploy, but only 
the size of th.e mis~le . silos themselves. 23 'Ibis was made clear in his 
criticism of the Soviet deployment of the SS-19 missile, which was f'i.f'ty 
percent larger than the anticipated size of' Soviet missiles at the time 
of the signing of the agreement. Since the SS:-19 can fit into the silos 
of SS-ll missiles, it is technically not a violation of the agreement. 
Schlesinger remarked that ambiguous agreements that do not account .for 
20) "Kissinger Answers His Critics•·, u.s. Hews and World Report, 
DeeElllber 22 1 1975, P• 2S 
21) ibid., P• 25 
.22) Cecil Brownlow, "Soviet Weapons Work Seen as SA.LT Violation•, 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 8, 19751 P• 16 
·. :;2J) Clarence A. Robinson, •Cabinet Shi.f'ts Mq Speed SALT", 
Arlation Week and Space Technology, Noveni>er 101 1975, P• 12· 
cirC1.DStanoes suob. as these were part of a Kissinger strategy o! negoti-
ating 11Pre aaptive concessions• to the Soviets.24 
Despit.e the Sch1esinger criticism o! the SALT I agreement, the 
Defense Secretary still believed that a SALT II agreement should be 
reached. Bn Sch1esinger•s criticism of the Kissinger negotiating 
st7le does shaw that each Secretary bad a fundamenta.l..ly different per-
ception as to what is negotiable and what is not. The examination of 
Schlesinger's critici!Dls o! Kissinger on SALT negotiating strategy prove 
that be believed that militar;y advances made by the Soviet Union must be 
~ed. comparati vel.y rather than on their own merits. On1Y one that 
prevents the Soviet Union from gaining advantages .tran a loose interpre-
tation of the agreement can be acceptable to u.s. national security' 
decision makers. Secretary Kissinger believed that the strict enforce-
ment of a SALT agreement and a demand for concessions on the pa.rt of the 
' Soviets on t.he backfire bomber coW.d make the Soviets decide .to leave the 
negotiating table and resu:ne an unending anis race. These positions are 
di.rec~ rel.ated to each man' 8 belie! system and his perception of what 
is at stake in st.rat.egic ams limitation negotiations. · 
Kissinger's Control of Information 
Kissinger's dominant role as both Secretary of State and National. 
Security Council advisor to the President was of increasing importance 
as the policy disagreements betnn Kissinger and sCbl.e singer became 
apparent to all by 197S. Secretary Schlesinger• s most revealing comment 
24) Drew Middleton, •Schlesinger's Views of Kissinge:r Described•, 
The New York Times, November 8, 197S, P• 2 
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as to Kissinger's dem.inance was that the Secretary or st.ate wOlll.d often 
·•'throttle debate•• and fail to bring to the President policy .. recommend-
ations and opposing points or view fram Scb1esinger and other N.SC 
members.2.S Kissinger and Schlesinger were said to have engaged in 
heated debates over ams negotiating strategy at DlBJlY of these NSC 
meetings. 26 
Secretary Schlesinger waa a1so disturbed by the illct that Secretary 
Kissinger did not .inform the Penta.gen as to the September 197S negotia-
tions on the Sinai agreement.27 Whether or not. Secretary Kissinger had 
come to make a habit of not infoming other government o!f'icia1s as to 
the status of nego:tiations and agreements has been a topic or consider-
able debate in this country, especi.all:r the charge that he kept President 
Ford in the dark as to possible Soviet violations of the SALT I and ABK 
agrea:nents.28 In any event, the tendency of Kissinger to centralize the 
channels of communication to the President· forced Secretar,r Sch1esinger 
to becane mre vocal in his · criticisms of American negotiating strategy. 
Conflict over the Pershing )fissile 
Secretary of' State Kissinger and Secreta.ey of De.fense Schlesinger 
also disagreed on whether the United states sbou.l.d pro-vi.de Israel Yi.th 
2.S) "Ford's Costly Purge", Time~ November 17, 1975, P• 12 
26) "Dete:nte: H.K.! J.s.•, Time, November 171 1975, P• 20 
27) Bernard Ouertzman, "Behind Shirt.s Pllsh for Arms Pact", 
The New York Times, November 4, 1975, P• 1 
28) R. Hotz, "The Case Against Kiesingeru, Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, Decanber 81 1975, P• 
7l. 
Pe~hing Jfissiles.29 Kissinger wanted to giTe the Israelis the means 
by which they could dei"end themse1ves ill the event of another Arab 
attack and maintain the semblance of a balance of power in the Middle 
Fast. Secretary Schlesinger, while aclmowledging the importance o! a 
military equilibrilDll in the Middle F.ast• saw the providing of Pershing 
missiles to Israe1 as sanething that cou1d dep1ete the u.s. stockpile 
of that. missile• since the United States had stopped its production.JO 
Schlesinger was concemed about the effect that this woul.d have on u.s. 
defense capabilities. just as Kissinger was concemed with the impact 
that a revelation o:C our lmowledge or Soviet radar vi.olations would have 
on our ability to get intelligence about such violations in the future. 
In each case the Seeretariea~disagreed, bu.t the motivation for the 
disagreement was the same. · _ 
The Forward Based Systems-FBS 
Another issue that separated Secretary Kissinger and Secretar,r 
Schlesinger was that of the place of the Forward Based Systems in 
rmclear anns l1mi ta.tions. The Forward Based Systems are nuclear-eqfdpped 
aircra.f't and missiles that are based in Europe. Secretary Kissinger· 
wanted to keep the FBS out of the SALT negotiations and put them in the 
Mutual Balance and Force 'Reductions talks at Vienna. Secreta.r;y Schlesinger 
29) Dana Adams Schmid~, "Firing Leaves Kissinger Without Cabinet 
Chall.enger0 • The Christian Science Monitor. November 4. 1975, 
P• 4 · 
30) Clarence A. Robinson, "Cabinet Shi:f'ts May Speed SALT11 1 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, November 10, 1975, P• l.2 
disagreed,, saying that the Fm should be pnt in the SAI!l' document.31 
Here again is an example of a polici disagreement that helped to set 
the two Secretaries at odds with one another. 
The Inevitable Policy Conf'rontation 
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From a study of the disagreements between Secretary of state Henry 
Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Scb1esinger it is clear:Q" 
evident that both men disagreed on what the arms negotiating policy of 
the United states should be. These disagreements were generated out 
of differences aliJ to their perception of the Soviet threat and their 
de.t"inition of what constitutes a threat to the national security of the 
United States. Schlesinger inSisted that the United States maintain a 
position of superiority in the negotiating sessions, ~d was inclined 
to favor a relat.ive:cy hard line stance towards the Soviets.32 Not only 
did Schlesinger believe that the United States should not make any 
concession to the Soviets, but he also took the position that it should 
be the Soviets who should be making the concessions.33 Kissinger's fear 
was that a prolonged use of a strategy such as Schlesinger was advancing 
could lead the Soviets to believe that it was the United states that was 
trYing to use detente to gain a strategic advantage, and thereby lead to 
31) The Econamist, November 81 197.S, P• ··l.6 
32) 11 Furlher Fallout From the Shake Up•1, Time, Novanber 24,, 197.5, 
p. 29 - --
33) John Finney, "Uncertain Pentagon Asks 'What Rumsfeld's Policy 
Ia", The New York Times, November 5, 197.5, P• 24 
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a deterioration in the negotiation~~Jh Kissinger's emphasis on actions 
of decision makers are important in this regard. The actions of the 
leaders of the United states should be cooperative and conciliatory, 
and attempts to gain an advantage over the Soviets in arms limitations 
negotiations could lead to a breakd01m in the detente relationship. 
'Ille desire of Kissinger and President Fort to obtain a SAI:r II 
agreement in an election ;rear faded aft.er the removal. of Dr. Seh1esinger 
from the Pentagon. The Soviets saw Schlesinger as an obstacle to a new 
SALT accord.35 While President Ford stated that he ~s under no timetable 
to reach an agreement with the Soviets, :in January of 1976 he sent Dr. 
Kissinger to Moscow to confer with Breshnev and Kosygin on SAI.:l' II, and 
the White House reported that the President had reached an agreement 
within the Administration on a can.promise prowsal. for SALT II.36 Such 
a proposal. might have been resisted by Schlesinger. The Soviets, ever 
wary of the impact the Presidential campaign on American negotiating 
strategy, began to stall on the u.s. pl"Oposals because of the internal 
debate over detente in the United States. With Secretary of State 
... . . . 
Kissinger coming under vicious attack from the anti~etente forces in the 
tmited states, President Ford was forced to reconsider the effects that 
a SALT II agreement might have on the .Administration and its conduct of 
foreign and defense policy, and decided not to pursue SALT II any further 
.. 
34) "Pentagon: .A. Strong Voice is S'J;illeda, u.s. News and World 
"Report, November 17, 1975, P• 17 
35) Peter Osnos, "Kremlin Saw Defense Chief as Foe•, 
The Washington Post, NovElllber 4, 1975, P• 1 
36) The New York Times, February 171 1976, P• 18 
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this year.37 The firing of Schlesinger opened up a new r01.U1d of criticism 
of Secretar;r Kissinger and President Ford, and instigated a debate in this 
country over Kissinger's negotiating strategies and the benefits of detente. 
The result was the postpomment of the SALT II agreement. 
The need for a President to surround himself with individuals of 
opposing points of view is necessary in any administration. But once a 
policy has been decided upon, there is a need to unite behind it if it is 
to be successful. A failure to accanplish a push towards accomodation 
on a policy decision, according to fonner Johnson Administration aide Roger 
Hilsman, can lead to a breakdollll in the system of policy making itself: 
"••• there is in a1l participants an intuitive realization 
that prolonged intransigence, stalemate and indecision m 
urgent and fundamental issues might becane so intolerable 
as to threaten j~e very fonn and structure of the system 
of govemancen. 
It is the responsibility of the President to maintain an organiza,.. 
tion that can inform him as to the problems that are present in the 
making or American national security policy. The President should 
encourage an adversary relationship between his Cabinent members and 
advisors in the fonnul.ation of policy, but it is imperative that 
unanimity be present if its execution is to be effective. If conflicts 
cannot be resolved, participants in the decision making process eventu-
ally may try to alter or change the rules by whicll decisions have been 
37) The New York Times, April ll, 1976, P• 1 
38) Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and 
Foreign Affairs, (Harper and Row: New York, 1971) P• 117 
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made.39 If this becomes evident to the President, he 11'.i.ll be put into 
the position or chooaing betw~ rival policies. If the Secretary ot 
state is involTed, one wcml.d eJCPeot that the President would adhere to 
the advice of the Secretary of state, because the relationship between 
the President and his .foreign secretary is the most important one in the 
malting of .American foreign poll·cy. 40 
Secretary Kissinger~s dominance in the nationa1 security decision 
mald ng process made it difficult for Secretary Sch1esinger to get his 
alternatives to the President in a fonn that waul.d present cogent 
rebuttalB to the Kissinger proposals. At least that was the Sch1esinger 
cl.aim. This coni>ined llli. th the serious policy differences on detente, 
. . 
SALT negotiating strategy and the issue o! Soviet violations of past 
ag~eements led Schlesinger to publicly disagree with inany Administration 
policies. Schlesinger decided to risk the wrath of the President, and 
continued his criticisms, ~ong with open comments on the irresponsibil-
ity of the Congress. _Schlesinger had been known to want to use his. 
office to •stimulate a great debate about American defense policies". hl. 
This is perhaps the motiw.tion for his candor. Soon the disagreements 
•voo.ld beocne so intense that the President would have to choose which 
man would stay and which would go. 
39) Yorton H. Halperin, Bttreaucratic Politics and Foreign Policz, 
('!be Brooldngs Institution: Washington, n.c., l974) P• iOii 
40) ibid., p. -111 
41) Leslie H. Gelb, "Schlesinger .for Defenses De.fense £or Detentea, 
The New York Times Magazine, August h, 1975, P• 35 
Chapter VII 
KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER: THE DIA REPORT AND THE DEFENSE BUDGET 
'nle division within the Ford Administration on national security 
affairs was exacerbated by the release of a report by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency that questioned Soviet motivations for pursuing 
detente. The report, released just a few days before the .firing o.f 
Secretary of Defense Schl.esinger, had angered Secretary o.f State 
Kissinger to such an extent that he blamed Schl.esinger for its release. 
A.f'ter this incident the decision making point became inevitable for 
President Ford. The President would have to decide whether it was 
possible to coordinate foreign and defense policy under circumstances 
such as these. 
Secretary of state Kissinger was angered by · the fact that the DIA 
document had been allowed to c:lrcul.a.te throughout the Department o! 
Defense, and eventua.11.y reach the hands of an outside, private organiza-
tion, the .American Security C.ouncil.l The American Security Council is 
a conservative organization that is kn.awn to be skeptical of the detente 
policy with the Soviet Union and is highly cri tieal of Secretary Kissinger's 
policies in general. The report was released to the American Security 
Council in October of 19751 and the major responsibility for its release 
appears to be with both Lieutenant General Daniel o. Graham, the Director 
of the DIA, and fo:nner Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. 
1) Joseph Kra.f't, "The Crumbling Administration•, The Washington 
Post, November 4, 19751 P• 14 
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The report was worded in a manner that would cause either President 
Ford or Secretary of State Kissinger to wonder if the Pentagon was in 
the process of undermining the foreign policy objectives of the entire 
Administration. The major thrust of the DIA report is well established 
by the statement in it that, 
"For the Soviets, detente is intended to facilitate their 
attainment of overalJ. ·.d<l!linance of the West •• • in the U.S. 
detente tends to be seen as an end in itself, in the u.s.s.R 
it is seen as a strategy for achiev.ing broader Soviet objec-
tives as well as tactical aims without fueling the sorts 9f · 
concerns that might galvanize the West into serious counter-
action.a 
"Soviet long term strategic objectives, 'Which the detente 
strategy seeks to promote include: •• •• the establishment of 
Soviet political., military, technological and economic super-
iori ty worldwide. Soviet detente strategy has facili ta.ted 
Soviet strategic eJCPansion and the cancelling out of u.s. 
superiori~y without provoking erlensive Western counter 
efforts." 
The DIA report continued to question the motivation of the Soviets 
in pursuing strategic arms limitation agreements, and specifically 
stated that the policy of detente had served Soviet purposes well and 
that because of that, the Soviets would not discard it but try to use 
it to gain other advantages over the United states. The DIA repOrt 
speci.fica1ly said that, 
. 1) The long range goal of the Soviets was to break up the Westem 
. :· .. ,:·. :Alliance and force a u.s. military wi thd.rawa.1 :f'loa!l Europe1 
2) "Detente in Soviet Strategy", an Estimate by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, September 2, 1975, 
reprinted in the Washington Report (October 197.5) P• l of the 
American Security Council 
2) Detente has encouraged .further Soviet nuclear arms expansion, 
3) Soviet nuclear expansion has forced the United States to try to 
accC111odate the Soviet Union through concessions at the strategic 
arms limitation negotiations, 
4) The end result of these developnents has been to neutra1ize the 
technological advantage of the United states, 
.5) The Soviet Union is trying to isol.a.te Communist China until new 
leadership cmies to power after the death of Mao, 
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6) The Soviet Union is still prepared to exploit any crisis that might 
arise in any area of the globe, 
7) The Soviets will eventually discard detente if they can gain more 
by other means.3 
The DIA report went even further in its criticism of American 
negotiating strategy. in saying that, 
"In strategic weaponry, Soviet detente policy bas created 
a climate that has facilitated SALT agreements under which 
the u.s. Wa.s prepared to freeze force4 levels but a.llmr!:the Soviets to build mmierical parity. •." 
The American policy, according to the report, along 1d. th Soviet 
strategic nuclear expansion, allowed the Soviets to achieve· a force 
structure that neutralized America's qualitative superiority• The 
effect that the report had on the state Department and Secretary 
Kissinger in particular was to create doubts in their minds as to 
3) "Detente Study Feu1ed Kissinger-Sch1esinger Feud11 1 
Aviation Week and Space Technolog;r, November 10, 1975, 
P• lJ 
4) ibid., P• 13 
whether the Pentagon wou1d support a:rrr .future negotiations with the 
Soviets on SALT n. S\teh divisiveness cou1d only hurt the prospects 
for a new arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union. President 
Ford was faced with a decision that cou1d trigger enormowLbostillw 
towards his administration no matter what his decision was. 
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The Ford Administration was divided against intself on national. 
security,issu.es -'Of ~.'the :highest importance. Differences of opinion 
that were long in the making came to a crossroads in which an evaluation 
of the strengths and weaknesses in continuing this arrangement had to 
be taken into consideration. With the State Department being accused 
of not giving the Pentagon all the information that it requested on 
the substance of the Sinai negotiations, and the Secretary of state 
having previously not consulted 1l:i th the Pentagon on the assurances 
that the u.s. gave Israel that it would consider giving them Pershing 
missiles 1 the groundwork had already been l.aid for a relationship 
that coul.d become increasingly tense and hostile.5 Tensions were made 
worse by the continued domination by Secretary Kissinger of the means 
of access to the President on issues of national security by virtue of 
being NSC advisor to the President. With the substantive differences 
of opinion between both Secretary Kissinger and Secretary Sch1esinger 
over SALT, the cruise missile, the backfire bomber and Ml:RV•s, it is 
little wonder that Schlesinger and the Pentagon wolild come to the point 
where they appear to be openly forcing a decision on the part of the 
5) ·Bernard Guertzman, ''Behind Shift: Pnsh for Arms Pact", 
The New York Tim.es, November 41 19751 P• 1 
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President on ·tbe future of .American national security policy. With t.he 
release of the DIA report in October of 1.9151 what can be seen is that 
the Administration was divided, and .that the state and Defense Depart.. 
ments were openly hostile to one another. 
President Ford could not tolerate this situation much lcmger. To 
fire Schlesinger wau1d lose him the political support of conservative 
'Republicans and Democrats and would .fuel the anti-detente lobby with 
more evidence of the fact that Kissinger was too powerful. in the 
Administration. Liberals woul.d express the fear that Kissinger was 
without an opponent of his own stature in the Administration, who while 
not in agreement; with ·their own phil.osophies1 could at least provide 
a check to Kissinger's influence. To remove Kissinger would undennine 
Ford's foreign policy in the eyes of the rest of the world, and would 
. . 
cause the Soviets to wonder if' the United states was about to revert 
back to the policies of the Cold War. The Soviet perception of 
Schlesinger as a hard liner and an advocate of "counterforce" nuclear 
strategies that couJ.d ·upset the status of detente should not be 
discounted. as a possible reason for the Schlesinger removal. The 
Soviet fear that detente was losing support among the American· people 
was a major reason for the inability of the United States and the 
Soviets to reach an agreement on SALT II. The Schlesinger removal. 
could have made this easier from this perspective. The . ·irony is in 
that the Sch1esinger removal increased. the detente debate within the 
United States and forced the President to reconsider his position on 
SALT II, fearing that concessions made by the United States would 
further damage his foreign and defense poli~ies in an election yea:r. 
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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger worsened his al.ready tenuous 
position in the Administration when he outspok~ criticized the Congress 
and the Administration for cuts in the defense budget. This was~ the 
primary reason for the removal of Sch1esinger1 ba.t it did provide the 
Administration with an excuse to remove Scbl.esinger and downplay the 
importance of the differences between Schl.esinger and Kissing_er on SA.LT 
and detente. The defense budget issue is important in that Secretary 
Kissinger also wanted to keep defense spending at as econanical le"nll as 
possible because he feared that increase in armaments and militar,. 
spending 110uld c~ at the expense of detente. 6 
Secretary Schlesinger's actions continued to be a source or 
discomfort for the Administra ti.on and President Ford. On October 20th 
the Secretary held a news conference that criticized the House Appropria-
tions Canm:ittee for making cuts in the defense budget that were described 
by the Secretary as "deep, savage and arbitrary". 7 The cuts would have 
amounted to $7.6 billion fran the -proposed $97.6 billion budget requested 
b7 the Administ.ration. 6 Schlesinger himself' wanted . a $13. 7 billion 
increase in defense sperxling for Fiscal Year 1976.9 President Ford, u 
6) Joseph Franm, "Kissinger-Schlesinger Feud•·, u. Se News and 
World Report, July 221 l.9741 P• 22 
7) John McNaughton, 11The Ford Upheaval. and Some Explanations", 
The New York Times, November 61 191.$1 P• lh 
6) uFord1s Cost~ Purge", ~I November 171 1975, P• 17 
9) 'nle Congressional. Quarterly, November 81 1975, P• 2349 
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a minorit7 President llbo was not elected, could ill afford poor rela.-
t~ons with 1egisl.ati'Ye branch that would have been heightened if 
Schlesinger had continued his attacks. Schl.esinger•s concern over 
Soviet increases in its defense budget and military manpower have been 
previously refered. to. (See Chapter IlI PP• 22-2.3). 
Secretary Schlesinger was also bighl,y critical of the Administra.-
tion•s proposal to cut the defense budget for Fiscal. Year 1977. The 
Office of !fanagEID.ent and Bwiget had proposed. an $8 billion C1It in the 
Defense Department's budget for FY 1977.16 President Ford's desire to 
keep the total budget down was obvious'.q a major factor in the OYB 
proposal. Secretary of State Kissinger had always believed th.at u.s. 
defense polic;y should be made mindfttl. of the effects that increased 
budgets would have on the condo.ct of foreign pol.ic7 and the impression 
it would give to the Sovi.et Union. Because Sch1esinger iras . .advocating 
an· increase in the defense budget, and it has already" been demonstrated 
that the great majority of u.s. defense spending accounts for militar"J" 
pay canpensation and pensions, the increase1r that Sehl.esinger Was 
requesting coul.d only come in the area of strategic weaponey and conven-
tional weapanr,r. Kissinger was uneasy w1. th Schlesinger's statE1Dents about 
the need to increase military" spending in order to match that of the 
Soviets because he believed that this 110uld hurt his e.f'f ort.s to reach a 
· · second arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.11 1.'he issue of the 
10}· The Congressional Qu:a.rt.er'.q1 November 81 1975, P• 2349 
11) ibid. P• 23h9 
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defense budget. was not ~ an area o! disagreanent between Schlesinger 
and the President, l:a1; also one that had ramifications that concemed 
the Secretary er state. SALT and the cmnparative Soviet-American stra-
tegic arms balance were once again at the center o! the issue. 
Sch1esinger himself is reported to have said that a second SALT 
agrement coul.d have been negotiated b7 Kissinger during June o:f 1974.. 12 
Kissinger was blamed by some technical eJtPE!l"ts for ordering Secretary 
Schlesinger not to subnit position papers written by the· Joint Chiefs of 
sta.tt in Connection with the July 1974 Slllllllit fer then President Nixon's 
c~nsideration.13 Both the JCS and Schlesinger wanted to press the 
Soviets for more concessions on. nucl.ear missiles than Kissinger believed 
was negotiabl.e at the time. The issue of defense budgeting on 8.1'7'18 
negotiations was undmmtedly another example of how Kissl.nger and 
Schlesinger di.f'fered on arms negotiating strategy with the Soviet Union. 
Was Schlesinger forcing the issue before the consideration of 
the President? .His dissent from the Administration's policies were onl7 
pa.rt of the reason why an iitevitab1e Kissinger-Schlesinger feud came 
about. His inabilit7 to judge the political oonsequenc·es of national 
securit,. decisions and his own concern. with the substance of the iSB11e 
.fits his own non-rationa.1 model. of decision -.king that is mere concerned 
obtaining the best alternative in policy decision :maldng rather than the 
12) Leslie H. Ge1b1 "Schlesinger for Defenses Defense for Detente•. 
The New York Times :Magazine• Augast la, 1974, P• h3 
.13) R. Hotz, "The Case Against Iissinger•, Aviation Week and 
~ee Technology• DeeEmber 8• 1975• P• lli 
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most accepta.b1e one tor all parties concerned. 
A serious dispute was to emerge between the state Dopariment. and 
the White House on the one hand and the Pentagon and Secreta.17 Schl.esinger 
on the other in the last ·da:rs before Sch1esinget"•s remova:L as Defense 
SecretB.17. The White HollSe accused Schlesinger of having leaked to the 
press the disagreements that he bad with Secretar;r or state Kissinger 
over troop dep~~ents in Europe.lh there was no substantiating 
evidence to back this charge. In the Pentagon, aides :to Secretary 
SChlesinger were afraid that the White Hou.se and the state Department 
were trying to weaken Dr. Schlesinger's role as a counter to Kissinger 
on· national security affairs. The Schlesinger aides saw the remowl. or 
Dr. Schlesinger as the resu1t or a •state Department campaign aimed at 
weakening Schlesinger• s position •·.15 The antagonisms that were notice-
ab1e between the tllO Secretaries over SALT II, Soviet violations 
of the SAL'l' I and ABM agreements and the defense budget caused Kissinger 
to come to see Schlesinger as a ri"f'al. who would threaten his policies 
and negotiating strategies, which was a complete change from Kissinger's 
perception of Schlesinger in 197h.i. l.6 Whether Schlesinger actua.lly" was a 
threat to the success of a SALT II agrement will neTer be known, but his 
14) Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, •Into1~1e Dissent•·, The 
Wal!!lhington Post, November 6, 1915, P• 2.7 
15) Drew 18.dcll.eton, •Schlesinger's Views of Kissinger Described.n, 
The New York T:illles, November 81 1975, P• 2 
16) •Schlesi.nge1"' on Defensen, Aviatlori Week and Space Technology, 
October 21, 1974, P• 9 
renoval. onl;r served to force the Soviets to rethink the wiadaa or nego-
_tiating with a United States that was interna~ divided over the wisdom 
of detente. 
The decision Clll the part or the President to ask f'or Secretar.r 
Schlesinger's resignation came suddenly' and without warning. Part or 
the reason for this is because the vast majorit:r of the public and even 
the Congress, intellectual establishment and the media was not aware or 
the internal di.vision within the Administration that is "typified b7 the 
DIA report. President Ford's statement that 11nei ther policy nor personal 
dirf'erences11' were involved in the Kissinge?1-Scb1esinger f'eud cannot be 
taken seriously. 'lbe President was f'aced with an embarrassing situation 
.· .. 
that gotten out or control, and was attempting to deny his past mistakes 
by refusing to admit that the substantive poli07 differences between 
Kissinger and Schlesinger had divided his Administration. Eventually the 
President was forced to admit that there was an antagonism that existed 
between Kissinger and Sch1esinger, but b;r that time' his credibility had 
been bad:cy' damaged.17. 
The policy confrontation that evolved in the Ford Administration 
between Secretar;r or state Henr;y Kissinger and Secretary- or Defense 
. . 
James Schlesinger was one that was made inevitable because or their 
_differing theoretical conceptions of the international system, the 
nature or power in the nuclear age and the importance or detente as a 
stabilizing factor in the relations between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The seriCJllsness of the poliey confrontation was felt 
17) •Ford Finally Admits Tension Led to Shake Up•, 
The New York Times, November 16, 197.S, Part IY, P• 2 
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throughout the Ford Administration.18 
The differences o:r opinion on substantive issues between Kissinger 
and Schlesinger can be t.raeed t.o their concept.ions of panr and t.he 
decision making process in national security affairs. Kissinger's 
rational model or decision making pl.aces greater emphasis no negotiation 
or di f:ferenees, the complexity or mill tary power and t.he importance o:t 
macropolities. Kissinger's conception of "1egitimaten' and "revolutionary" 
international systems best explains his belief that the Soviets are now 
status quo oriented powers, coneemed with preserving the gains that 
they already have made. His concern for the reduction of tensions, a 
reduetian or the development of new weapons technologies, and fOr inter-
national cooperation gives him a di:fl'erent definition or what is the 
nationa1 security than does Dr. Schlesinger. 
Schlesinger's faith in deterrence and the need for a preservation 
of the military equilibriUlll between the United States and the Soviet 
Union Bhows a different motivation than that or Dr. Kissinger. For 
Scb1esinger, det.ente is made possible because o:f 1tan lmderlying 
equilibrium of force•.19 The Soviet desire for a reduction in tensions 
does not pay as great a role in his developaent of a ratimale as to why" 
"detente" is the present state or relations between the two superpowers. 
The disagreements between Kissinger and Schlesinger over detente 
is perhaps best demonstrated by the fact that Schlesinger himself 
19) James R. Schlesinger, "Weakness Invites Conflict11=• 
Vital Speeches or the Day, October 15, 1975, P• 2 
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nmilled highly skeptica1 aver Savi.et motivations .for pursuing d.etente. 
Far 1h:m becoming a status quo oriented pOlf'er, the Sorlets, in Sch1e-
silll:' e view, <b not wish to posi;pone national liberation movements 
andllllr8 of liberation, but instead wish to increase the ideologica1 
stngle between the superpowers. Sch1esinger states that, 
•rn the Soviet view, detent.e itself is the consequence of 
the outgrowth of Soviet power, which bas f"orced the West 
to grant concessions.... Far :f'ran sharing the Westem 
Tiew of detente as gradual reconciliation, w.i th the hope 
of ending the possibility o:f conflict, the Soviets view 
detente as rich w.i. th opportunities f"or major gains-in 
short, as confrontation in another guise". 20 
With two opposing phi1osophies such as these it should be 
reill!rated that the t110 Secretaries did not disagree on whether 
daiim.te exists, but over the meaning of it. I:f detente means that 
the iidted. states can reduce its commitments around the world and 
drallnically reduce its defense budget, then the definition of the 
natima.l security has a1so been dram.atioal]3' changed. Hem. will an 
.A:med:an President ever justify sending u. s. troops into combat in 
an tft'ort; to "cOntain" Commnnism.1 as in Korea and Vietnam, if the 
SavJdB are now a status quo power? Do potential liberation movements 
in .ft.i:.ca and South America have no importance to the U.S. national 
secmi\y? Above all, does detente mean that the United States can 
witVl'aw into a period of neo-isol..ationism, being totall.y concerned 
witbits own domestic problems, while neglecting the problems that face 
the.arld at the international level? The answers to these questions, 
20) James R. Schlesinger, •A Testing Time Fer America", 
Fort.mie, Februal'1' 19761 P• 147 
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and t<> the rea~ons for 'the Kissingel\-Schl.esinger controversy in 'the Ford 
Adninistration must lie in an analysis of the nature of the international 
S1'Stem1 the ability of nations to use power to influence or deter other 
nations f'r<n exhibiting certain kinds o! behavior and in the process by 
which national secu.ri ty decision ma.leers develop policies that shoul.d be 
:followed if peace is to be preserved. 
Cbapt.er VIII 
KISSINGER AND SCHIESOOER: FOREIGN AND AMERICAN REACTION 
The interest with which the naticns around the wor1d viewed the 
Kissinger-SChlesinger controversy shou.ld not be over1ooked. For it 
establishes the int.ensit7 of the two Communist giants reactions to the 
controversy and also the doubts that our NATO and West European allies 
had as to the strength or the American commitment to their defense. It 
shows once again that the perceptions of nations as to the foreign and 
defense policies of the United States is in large measure influenced by 
the individuals who man the decl sion making positions in nationa1 secu-
rit.y affairs. Policy al.one is not saffi.cient. Policy differel)ces, as 
we ha.Te seen, can be so intense that .foreign nations will be confused 
. 
as to Wiat American policy actually is. '!he reactions and perceptions 
of nations to the Kissinger-.Scblesinger controTersy rlll S1ow that. this 
incident was of great interest t.o the international. conummity, specific-
cally, the Soviet Union. 
Soviet Reaction 
The Soviet Union was delighted with the removal of Secretary 
Schlesinger from his position, as could be expected frce the fears 
about him that were voiced in the past. The Soviets corroborate the 
findings of the author that the disagreements between Secretary Kissinger 
and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had been centered on detente and 
the strategic arms limitation negotiating strategy; of the United states 
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with the Soviet Union.1 The Soviets are also to have reported that the 
Atlantic Ccmmwrl.ty and supporters of NATO would "miss the politician who 
tirelessly warned of the Soviet threat•.2 In the eyes of the Soviets, 
the dismissal of Secreta.r;r Schlesinger was seen as a victory .for detente 
and the policies of the Ford-Kissinger Administration. 
The Soviets had been following the Kissinger-Schlesinger feud 
close]Jr for more than one year.3 'lhe Soviets regarded a victory by 
Kissinger as essential if the detente relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was to cmtinue. The great majority of the 
study that was done by the Soviets on the Kissinger-Sehl.a singer feud 
was done by specialists at the Kremlin think-tank, the USA Institute 
for International Relations and World Economics.4 The Institute 
followed the differences on policy between Kissinger and Schlesinger 
for over a year,. and came to the conclusion that Kissinger's approach 
to bargaining 111. th the Soviet Union was endangered by the presence o.f 
Schlesinger in the Administration. They na~uralJ.y warmly endorsed the 
move by President Ford to dismiss Schlesinger. 
The Soviet news agency TASS' reported that the editor ar the Soviet 
magazine USA-EconCJllics, Politics, Ideology, Valentin Berezhkov, welcomed 
1) "Shake Up in Washington•, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 
November 261 1975, P• 23 
2) Current Digest of the Soviet Press, December 101 1975, P• 21 
3) Peter Osnos, "KrBnlin Saw Defense Chief as Foe"·, 
The Washington Post, November 4, 1975, P• 1 
4) "Personnel Changes Cause Strong Repercussions", Peking Review, 
November 141 1975, P• 20 
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tbe Schlesinger dismissal in ca11ing it tta positive developnent between 
the superpawers11·.S One could conclude that the harsh Soviet criticism 
of the Schlesinger retargeting policies, calls for increases in the 
defense budget, and hard line approach to strategic anns limitation 
negotiations with Soviets were the primary reasons for their approval 
of Ford's decision to replace Schlesinger. Whether Schlesinger actually' 
-...& an impediment to an improvement in Soviet-American relations is 
debatable, but the Soviet reaction to his removal does demonstrate the 
importance of the Kissinger-Soble singer incident and the diligence with 
which the Soviets studied the individual di:f.f'erences between the two 
Secretaries. 
Canmun:i.$t China's Reaction 
The Communist Chinese were dismayed by the firing of Secretary 
Schlesinger, fearing that the United States had succmnbed to the 
pressures for easy concessions to the Soviet Union in future anns 
limitation agreements negotiations. Quotes fl-om the Chinese interna-
tional news digest Peking Review of foreign reactions to the firing 
are entirely negative. Peking Review stated that the West Germans 
were "stunned"' by the firing, that the loss of Schlesinger would be 
detrimental to the NATO alliance and that the French paper France Soir 
stated that Schlesinger "was sacrificed on the altar of detenten.6 The 
Communist Chinese were concerned that the detente relationship between 
5) ibid. I P• 19 
6) ibid., P• 20 
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the thited states and the Soviet Union was being carried too far, and 
that they woul.d eventually becme the victims of the relationship. 
An ~is of the Soviet and Chinese reactions to the Kissinger-
Sool.esinger incident shows that the two Camnunist giant~ still hold a 
great deal of animosity towards one another. The Chinese are fearful 
that the "American connection" that bad been established by President 
Nixon was beginning to weaken. The Chinese response to the Schlesinger 
firing was one that was wary of Soviet motivations for pursuing detente, 
and they saw Schlesinger as a possibl.e ally in this regard. The Soviets 
.. 
sided with Kissinger in the controversy 1 and had nothing but negative 
remarks for Secretary Schlesinger. 
West German Reaction 
The West Gennans had favored Secretary Schlesinger's policies on 
the need not to sacrifice defense spending and preparedness for the sake 
of detente.7 In particul.ar, West Gennan Defense Minister Georg Leber was 
an ardent Schlesinger admirer. The West Gennans analyzed the incident 
in much the same way as did the Soviets and the Chinese. Schlesinger 
appeared to be an obstacle to a successful completion of the SALT II 
agreement, but West Gennan opinion was divided as to whether the United 
States would profit from a Kissinger diplomatic victory with the Soviets 
at SALT II.8 One West Gennan analyst commented on the fact that 
Kissinger 
7) Bernard Weintraub, "Nato Reported to Feel it is. LJ?aing Strong 
Ally", The New York Times, November 4, 1975, P• 25 
8) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6 
nUnllke Schlesinger, is prepared to bring in the technological 
advantage o:f the cruise missile~ the guided missile that can 
strike at military targets by ducking under radar screens to 
the nuclear exchange deal n·. ~ 
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Defense Minister Leber•s good relationship with Schlesinger was 
undoubtedly a reason for his sorrow at Schlesinger• s dismissal.. It 
should be .remembered that Schlesinger and Leber worked out an agreement 
during the weeks after the 1973 October War that provided that U.S. 
military equipnent would not be sent fran West Germany to Israel on 
Israeli ships. Kissinger's poor relations with the Europeans at that 
t:iJne most probably was remembered by the West Germans as they considered 
the impact of the Schlesinger removal. 
Great Britain, France and ItaJ.,z 
· Other European reaction to the removal of Dr. Schlesinger showed 
a coneern over the strength that Secretary of State Kissinger would now 
have in the making of American national security policy in the Ford 
Administration. From Great Britain, it was commented on that Secretary-
Kissinger would now have a free hand in the making of anns limitation 
agreements with the Soviet Union.10 Even when Dr. Schlesinger was 
admonished for his defense policies and desire to increase the techno-
logical capabilities of America's nuclear forces, he was praised in that 
he provided Kissinger with a countercheck to make sure that the ·_aprice of 
9) "Ford Shows Strength in Halloween Yassacre" 1 '!he German Tribune, 
November 16, 19751 P• 3 
10) The London Tines, November 5, 1975, P• 15 
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detente was not too high".ll 
The Icndon Times cited Secretary Schlesinger's desire to deve1op 
the cruise missile and the B-1 bmnber as reasons why he was considered 
an obstacle by the Soviets to another attempt t.o conclude the SALT II 
accords.12 Kissinger's wide acceptance on the part of the international 
carummity was seen as important in the decision to remove Schlesinger, 
because of the fact that the removal of Kissinger wOlll.d have jeopardized 
the stability of .American foreign poll cy at a ti.me when stability was 
absolutely necessary. 
The Italians and the French both expressed the belief that 
Schlesinger's removal would ease the way for Secretary Kissinger to 
negotiate a compromise at the SALT talks.13 '!heir insight into the 
the origins of the Kissinger-Sch1esinger feud suggests that all West 
:European nation~ not merely the West Germans am the British., were 
cognizant of the differences between the Secretary of st.ate 8J1d the 
Secretary- of Defense that divided the Administration on national 
security matters • . '11te reacticn of the European nations shows that 
there was a concern over the future of American policy., and that;tbe 
removal of Schlesinger apparently removed any doubts in their mind as 
to what policies t.he United States would foll.ow. Kissinger, however, 
was still the subject or cri tid.l!lll, and the Europeans feared that his 
influence could become too strong. 
11) ibid., p. 15 
12) The Icndon Times, November 4, 1975, P• 5 
13) At1as, December 1975, P• 6 
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Japanese Reaction 
The Japanese reaction to the removal of Secretary Schlesinger was 
mixed. The Japanese were more inclined t.o see politics as the motivation 
for the Schlesinger removal, but they did express concern that the United 
States was weakening its canmitments in the Far Ea.st. Secretar,r Schle-
singer had been an important participant in the promotion of US-Japanese 
relations and mutual understanding.lb. Schlesinger's reiteration of the · 
American defense commi. tment t.o South Korea was probably a major factor 
in the Japanese express.ion of concern. While the Japanese tended to 
discount the belief that ' Schlesinger's removal was a victory for Secre"'" 
tary Kissinger, they did state that "there will be a need :for reassur-
ances in this part of the world11 that the United States would retain a 
strong defense posture af'ter the removal of Sch1esinger.1S Whether t.he 
Japanese were fearful. that the United states would abrogate its respon-
sibilities to the Japanese was not clear, but the Japanese did remind 
.the .Americans that the United States-Japanese Security Treaty was still" 
16 
a basic U.S. policy". 
The Middle Ea.st 
The impact that the removal. of Secretary of Defense Sch1esinger 
had on Israel and Egypt was different, as one could expect. The 
Israelis, in spite of the delays that they experienced with the United 
lls.) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6 
15) The Japan Times, November 6, 1975, P• 12 
16) Atlas, December 1975, P• 6 
States over the resuppJ.7 ·crisis in the October War of 1973, were 
concerned that the rEllloval of Schlesinger would make it harder for 
than to get weapons from the United States. '!he Tel Aviv paper 
Yedioth .Ahronoth was particularly concerned over the i.m.pa.ct that the 
Schlesinger removal would have cm future weapons premrements .f'rtln 
the United states.17 If Schl.esinger was responsible for the resuppJ.7 
delays as was suggested, it is cert.a.inly ironic that the Israelis 
would be concemed about the effect of his rE!lloval. as Defense Secretary 
would have on their ability to obtain arms from the United St.ates. 
The Egyptians, aware of Schlesinger's criticism of the Soviet 
Union during the 1973 October War and his cooperation with Kissinger 
in the implementation of the worl.drlde alert o:f u.s. forces, had a 
different reaction to his dismissal. The Egyptians were report.ed to 
be delighted with bis ramovai.18 
The Reaction of NATO 
The reaction of NATO to the Schlesinger firing was greatest among 
a1l organizations concerned with .American cooperation with defense 
partners. Schlesinger had always been bigh]J' regarded at NATO and by 
European defense officials for favoring a strong Atlantic Alliance 
and defense preparedness for Europe. His opposition to the unilateral 
w.i thdrawal of American troops from the European continent was a primar,r 
17) llichae1 Getler, 11Defense Shift is a Jolt to Bonn, NAT011 1 
The Washington Post, November 31 197.5, P• lli 
18) The London Times, November 4, 1975, P• .5 
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reason for their admiration of the Defense Secretary. Schlesinger had 
the trust of the NATO officials because of his authoritative command of 
the subject of military strategy, his ability to make quick decisions 
and his ability to give the NATO defense ministers the philosophica1 
arguments to reinvigorate the NATO communi.ty.19 NATO official.s were 
especially concerned that the new u.s. Defense Secretary, Donald 
~sfeld, was a novice in the area of defense affairs and did not have 
Schlesinger's expertise.20 
The NATO concern was one of how strong the .American defense 
canmitment towards thElll would be after the remova1 of Secretary 
Schlesinger. The Western Europeans and the NATO officials, as might 
be expected, were concerned that Kissinger would cane to dominate the 
making of American defense policies towards Europe and NATO now that 
Schlesinger was out of the picture. The cordiality with which American-
NATO relations had been conducted during the tenure of Dr. Schlesinger 
as Defense Secretary were now subjected to new inputs that made 
European of:f'icials 110nder as to the strength of the American commitment 
to their defense. 
An Ana.qsis of Foreign Reaction 
An analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger 
incident shows that the foreign nations had a good grasp of the 
19) Benw;u··Jl'eintraub, "NATO Reported. to Feel it is losing strong 
~", The Hew York Times, November 4, 1975, P• 2S 
20) ibid •• P• 25 
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substantive issues that were the cause of the incidmt,, but that they 
did not have a clear wight as to how rar t.he Ferd AchiDistrat,ion bad 
been divided aga.:lllst itself over detente and the intensity of the 
mistrust that was alluded to in the release of the DIA report to the 
American Security Cotincil and the accusations by both the state and 
Defense Departments about the attempts by the other department to 
undennine their Secretary's inf'.lnence w.i.th the President was not 
mentioned, perhaps because of' the f'act that these accu.sations were not 
made public 'Wltil after the removal of Secreta.r,r Schlesinger. 
The Soviets, in particular, had a keen insight as to the theoretical 
and substantive differences that separated Kissinger and Schlesinger. 
The Soviets had been studying these differences for over a ;rear, and 
concluded that the rem.oval or Secretary Schlesinger would be in their own 
interests. But the reaction to the Schlesinger firing in the United 
States set of! a debate over detent.e policy with the Soviet Union that 
entered into the Presidential primary campaign and u1timate:cy- led to a 
postponement of the SALT II agreement. The Soviets decided to await the 
outeme of the debate within the United states and would not accept the 
compromise proposals offered by Secretary of state Kissinger. The 
firing of Secretary of Defense Schlesinger did little to make the 
conclusion or the SALT II agreement with the Soviets any easier. 
The American Reaction 
The dismissal or Secretary Schlesinger created a stom or protest 
from both the political right and left in this CO'ID'ltry. The right 
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regarded t.he firing as a mistake because they feared that. Kissinger was 
neglecting the changes made in the international balance of power dne t.o 
increases in Soviet strategic and military weaponry-. The political left 
that Kissinger wou1d become even more powerful. and tend to embark on even 
more JIOlo.' l)etfo:r.aiailces in the conduct of .American foreign policy, at the 
neglect of the powers of the Congress. The President was subjected to 
vast amounts of criticism in his handling of the Kissinger-Schlesinger 
feud that left sCJne observers wondering as to the effectiveness of his 
leadership. 21 The study of the substantive differences and ~osity 
between Kissinger and Seb1esinger should show, however, that the 
President could no longer tolerate this situation and made the correct 
decision. 
, Both llbe~a1s and con~ervatives, doves and ha*s, While disagree-. 
. . 
ing on Schlesinge.r' s basic _ assumptions about American national security 
polley-1 did agree that the Schlesinger removal marked a victory for 
Secretary of St.ate Kissinger. In spite of Kissinger's remo'V!ll as 
National Security Advisor to· the President, it was a~e4 that the 
Schlesinger firing placed Kissinger in a role in which he would be 
ev~n In.ore dominant in th~ dir~ction of American fo~ign policy. Conserv-
atives feared that the President wou1d be kept insulated from the counter 
arguments t.hat SChlesinger .had raised.22 Liberals feared a Kissinger 
hegemony over foreign policy and expressed the doubt t.hat t.he Soviets 
21) 'l'he Washington Post, November 51 1975, P• 26 
22) George F. Will, "Capit.al. Issues", National Review, 
November 211 1975, P• 1287 
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and the United. States would now reach a SALT II agreemant. 23 
The Ford Administration was severly criticized on Capital Hill for 
the Schlesinger firing. Democratic Senator Henry M. Jackson o! Washington 
expressed the opinion that the Ford decision showed that the President 
•coul.d not tolerate differences or opinion".24 Congressional opponents 
of Kissinger were relieved that be was no 1onger National Security 
Council Advisor to the President125 but many Congressmen thought that it 
was Kissinger, and not Schlesinger, who was the man that should have been 
removed.26 Congressional Republicans were worried that the Schlesinger 
firing would hurt the President politically, especially with the conserv-
ati ve wing of the party that was anxious to follow the lead of fonner 
California Governor Ronald Reagan and take the Republican Presidential 
nC111ination away .trcm the inc1J1I1bent President.27 
The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy had digressed far beyond 
the point of mere 0 differences of opinion". The· fact that each Secreta.17 
had a dii'ferent perception of detente and the means to preserve it bad 
led to a schism in the Ford Administration that had become so intense 
that antagonisms between the state and Defense Departments came out into 
the open and hurt. the cohesiTeness of the administration's national 
23) Tad Szu1c, 11The Firings and Foreign Policy", 
The New Republic, November 15, 1975, P• 8 
24) George lerdner, Jr., 11Ford Fires Schlesinger, Colby", 
The Washington Post, November J, 1975, P• l 
25) The Oregon Journal, November 3, 1975, P• 7 
26) The London Times, November 4, 1975, P• 5 
27) Rowland EVans and lbbert Novak, ''Miscalculating at the White 
House•, The Washington Post, November 5, 1975, P• 26 
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security policy. Accusations by the State Depa.rlment that the rel.ease 
of the DIA report to the .American Security CO\D'lcil endangered detente is 
not scmething that is charged because of a President's anibitions. The 
accusations by the Pentagon that Secret.ary Sch1esinger•s remova1 was the 
end resul.t ef a state Department campaign to weaken Schl.esinger1s infiu-
ence is not something that can be attributed to election year politics, 
the incompetency of the President or the fact that Kissinger hel.d down 
two jobs. The system of compromise and concensus building had canpletely 
broken down. 
Policy differences generated out of two entirely different view-
points on detente and America 1 s national security requirements were the 
principal reasons for the Kissingel'-Schlesinger schisn. The friction 
that evolved between Kissinger and Schl.esinger over detente and American 
negotiating strategy gave President Ford no other alternative but to put 
an end to the struggle as soon as possible and suffer the poll tica1 
consequences of the decision. To do otherwise would have aggravated 
the division within his administration and perhaps have led to a serious 
policy confrontation in the future when the need for CClllpromise and 
bargaining within the Administration would have been imperative. 
Chapter II 
KISSINGER AND SCHI.EfilWER~ CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS 
The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration 
was devel.oped out o.f theoretic~ di.:f.ferent conceptions o.f the utility 
o.f power as a deterrent in the internationa1 system, the means by which 
the United States should cmne to policy decision on matters of national 
security, and the very role that the United States shou1d play in the 
international system. These dif.f erences were so strong that a process 
of compranise in order to build a concensus on policy was made impossible 
in the Ford Administration. The fact that the decision makl.ng process 
in national security affairs is an inherently political. one, with values 
and beliefs- playing a major role in the process, should lBad one to the 
conclusion that the reason for the split between Kissinger and Schlesinger 
had to be because of their value orientations and belief' systems, rather 
than any other consideration. The refusal to canpromise or bargain, 
through which a concensus can be denied, was due to individual differences 
in theory and philosophy that transcended any other consideration. 
Differences on the nature of power, the rational and non-ratioo.al. 
approaches to national securi. ty decision ·making and the dispute over 
whet.her the Soviet Union viewed detente in the same manner as the West 
were found to be the underlying reasons .for the substantive policy dis-
agreements on such issues as SALT negotiating strategy, possible Soviet 
violations of pa.st agreements, u.s. defense spending and the importance 
of the growth of the Soviet military. The Kissinger model could be de-
scribed as one that inclndes a belief in political multipolarit;y and the 
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rationality of .the decision maker. Kissinger's description of 11revolu-
tiona.ryn and •legitimate11 international systems are ones that helped to 
con.finn. in his mind the belief that the Soviets are now wi.l.ling to 
l pursue policies that shaw "an element of restraint". The fact that 
the Soviets, in the Kissinger model, bad come to see that they could 
benefit from preserving the international system as it present~ is 
influenced his belief that the United States must adopt a foreign policy 
that is limited in its objectives and a national security policy that 
takes into account the need to preserve the present detente relationship. 
Power and deterrence as elements of a u.s. national security policy are 
considered of less importance to Kissinger than to Dr. Schlesinger. 
The Schlesinger model was found to stress a reliance on non-rational 
factors in the developnent of a national. security decision making process. 
Deterrence, the personality of' the decision maker and the importance or 
technological developnents are a11 considered to be primary factors that 
should be considered in the determination of a national security policy. 
The assumed rationality of the decision maker and his need to seek peace 
was not as import.ant as the perception of one's strength by other nations. 
Power was not considered in te:nns of its utility, but in term.a of its 
deterrent ef'fect. Schlesinger would agree that although it is of no 
utility for the United states and the Soviet Union to use nuclear weapons, 
it does not therefore mean that it is of no utility to have thElll. This 
is perhaps best demonstrated in Schlesinger's statement that detente is 
1) James E. Doman and Peter c. Hughes, "Power and Purpose in 
American Foreign Polic;r', Modern Age, Spring 1975, P• 173 
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not gained independently of a general mill tary and strategic equ:µibrium. 
The fact that detente rests on an equilibrium of force, according to 
Schlesinger, is an "underlying requirement for the preservation of 
intemational. political stability", and it is therefore important that 
the United States continue to maintain its commitments and strengthen 
its defenses in spite of detente.2 
The need to redefine the national security policy of the United 
States in an era of detente is the most important aspect in an ana.J.J'sis 
of the meaning of the Kissingel'o-Schlesinger dispute. Do deterrence and 
balance of power theories still matter in the age of detente? Does an 
increase in our capability to respond to potential. nuclear threats en-
hance deterrence? Or does it increase the risk of nuclear war? 
While Dr. Schlesinger believed that the balance of power and 
deterrence were requirements for the maintenance of inte:niational 
political stability, Dr. Kissinger does not share that belief. 
Kissinger has stated that, 
"The shape of the future will ultimately depend on the 
convictions that far transcend the physical balance of power". 3 
Kissinger• s approach is perhaps best described as one in which the 
Secretary wishes to present fewer OpPortunities to the superpowers and 
over nations for the use of nuclear weapons. Because nuclear warfare is 
almost a1wa.~ irrational, deterrence would be enhanced if fewer 
2) James R. Schlesinger, "Weakness Invites Conflict", 
Vital Speeches of the Day~ October 15, 1975, P• 2 
3) Hwy A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policz, (w. w. Norton & co.a 
New York, 1974) P• 80 
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opportunites were avail.able in whch a decision maker might attempt a 
nuclear war in hopes or gaining a temporary advantage.Ii Kissinger's 
writings and efforts as Secretary of state have been directed at trying 
to enhance deterrence through providing fewer opportunities for the 
utilization of nuclear weapons and through a nuclear policy that tries 
to negotiate force levels on the assumption that increases in nuclear 
force levels are a destabilizing influence on the strategic anns balance. 
The study of international politics ntUst include the study of such 
concepts as power, the national security, peace and diplomacy. Yfuen 
differing opinions emerge aver the meaning of these concepts, the prob-
lem is one of determining whether what are the political limitations or 
these concepts, and how a decision maker is to decide what is important 
and what is not important. At that moment, the factual evidence cC111es 
into play 1 and the decision maker must decide, upon the evidence that 
is before him, what policy to pursue. Kissinger and Schlesinger both 
observed evidences or changes in the military and strategic balance, .. : . 
changes in the can.position of the international system, and changes in 
the attitudes of the American public on issues of foreign and national 
. 
defense poll cy 1 and crone to fundamentally difi'erent conclusions as to 
how our national security policy shou1d be conducted. 
The study of their individual belief systems, decision making models 
and perceptions are important in 1.llldersta.nding uhy the substantive policy 
differences arose in the Ford Administration. Ir one was to look o~ 
at the substantive differences, he could oonclude ~the dispute 
4) Herbert Scovil.le, Jr., "Flexible Madness", Foreign Policy, 
Spring 1974, P• 164 
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occurred, but be would have di.fficul.ty concluding !!!lit occured. The 
study of the substantive policy dtl'ferences on issues such as SALT II 
negotiating strategy• detente with the Soviet Union• the size of the 
defense budget and possible Soviet violations of past agreements shaw 
that each Secretary disagreed on fundamental concepts in international 
poll tics such as power and the means by 'Which to cane to national. 
security decisions. Their di.fferences became so intense that the 
Defense Department issued a study questioning the whole concept of 
detente. 
The policy differences can be traced-to the differences that 
each Secretary bad of the international system, the role of power and 
deterrence, and the place of the decision maker in national security 
affairs. The administrative disharmony in the Ford Admi.nistration was 
the result of these differences. The President was forced to resQlve 
the schism throu.gh the removal of one of the two antagonists. Foreign 
and defense policy coordin~tian in bis administration would have 
continued to deteriorate had he refused to do so. 
The Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration 
has great significance if .t'uture administrations are to avoid reocCUI'-
rences or this situation. The coordination of defense and foreign 
policy is imperative in the present era of detente and nuclear parity. 
Above all the United States should heed the words or William P. Bundy 
when he wrote that the United States 
"••• should above all remain cool •• Refinements and continued 
research may be needed-- as I understand Secretary Schlesinger 
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is now proposing- but in the last analysis the United States 5 should refuse to be lured furl.her into an unending arms race." 
The international system has undergone many changes in the years 
since the end of the Second World War. These changes were to cause 
Secretary of state Heney A. Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. 
Schlesinger to disagree on major issues of national. security policy in 
the administration of President Gerald R. Ford. The theoretical differ-
ences between the two Secretaries were manifested at the substantive 
policy level. This proves the thesis that it was the theoretical and 
conceptual differences on the nature of the international system, power 
in the nuclear age and the process by which to arrive at national 
security decisions in an age of detente that made canprond.se impossible 
within the Ford Administration on issues of nationa1 security. 
5) William P. Bundy, "International Security Today", 
Foreign Affairs, October 1974, P• 28 
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